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CORPORATIONS AND AUTONOMY THEORIES OF

CONTRACT: A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW LEXMERCATORIA
NATHAN OMANt

ABSTRACT
One of the central problems of contractsjurisprudence is the conflict between autonomy theories of contract and efficiency theories of
contract. One approach to solving this conflict is to argue that in the
realm of contracts between corporations,autonomy theories have nothing to say because corporationsare not real people with whose autonomy we need to be concerned. While apparentlypowerful, this argument
ultimatelyfails because it implicitly assumes theories of the corporation
at odds with economic theories of law. Economics, in turn, offers a vision of the firm that is quite hospitable to autonomy theories of contract.
The failure of this argument suggests that a more fruitful avenuefor reconciling these competing approaches is to find a principled way of integratingthem into a single theory.
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INTRODUCTION

Many contracts scholars have long had an intuition that corporations
present a special problem for autonomy theories of contract law.' Most
of these theories implicitly or explicitly assume that contracting parties
are human beings rather than institutions. Hence, there seems something
suspect about applying such theories to corporations. Recently, scholars
have tried to use this intuition to solve some basic problems in the philosophy of contract law. In this paper, I hope to demonstrate that this
approach will not work. First, I articulate the hitherto inchoate arguments on which the intuition rests. Second, I demonstrate that despite
their initial plausibility, these arguments are flawed. Ultimately, the injection of corporations into contract law theory throws up new versions
of some old problems, but corporations do not pose a unique or fundamental challenge to autonomy theories of contract.
The most recent use of corporations in the debate over contract theory comes at a time when that theory is deeply divided. Contracts scholarship suffers from an embarrassment of theoretical riches. 2 Philosophers, 3 historians, 4 and economists5 have all entered the conversation. A
few generations ago, discussion centered on questions of the extent to
1. For example, in discussing form contracts, Todd D. Rakoff has written:
Refusal to enforce a contract of adhesion, the courts say, trenches on freedom of contract.
Implicit in the argument is an equating of the drafting organization with a live individual.
For what gives value to uncoerced choice - the type of freedom that the courts have in
mind - is its connection to the human being, to his growth and development, his individuation, his fulfillment by doing .... To see a contract of adhesion as the extension
and fulfillment of the will of an individual entrepreneur, entitled to do business as he sees
fit, is incongruous.
Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1236
(1983).

See also MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY

FOR THE BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 61 (1986) (arguing that corporations do not have "original autonomy rights"); Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
733 n.63 (1931) (noting the "pernicious heritage" in contract law scholarship of treating organizations as though they were people); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J.
1417, 1464-71 (2004) (arguing that his promissory theory of contract cannot be applied to contracts
between corporations).
2.
See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997) (discussing contemporary theories of contract law); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004) (same);
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993) (same).
3.
4.

See, e.g., THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT

DOCTRINE (1991); DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
(1999).
5.

See, e.g., THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)

(collecting essays on contract from an economic perspective).
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6
which contracts reflected the will of the parties or the rules of society
and the relative merits of achieving fairness or freedom.7 The debates
had the advantage of occurring in essentially the same language. 8 In
contrast, the contracts theorists of today find that it is difficult to talk
with each other even when discussing the same issues that exercised their
predecessors. While each approach operates with its own criteria for
successful theories, contracts scholars have not found a powerful and
widely accepted meta-theory that would allow them to adjudicate between the competing approaches. The search for such a meta-theory is
one of the major tasks of contemporary contracts scholarship.

One of the difficulties confronting a contracts theorist is the sprawling nature of contract law itself. Contracts have the potential to govern
everything from the sale of a cow by an individual farmer to disputes
over the acquisition of a multi-billion dollar oil company. 9 One strategy
for dealing with the theoretical pluralism is to narrow the field of inquiry
to purely commercial transactions.'0 The claim is that whatever its limitations elsewhere, in the realm of firm-to-firm contracts, economic
analysis should reign supreme." Thus, even if a unified theory of all
contracts is difficult, a unified theory of some significant subset of contracts may be possible.
The success of this latest move-which I shall call the new lex mercatoria (law merchant)-rests on its ability to dismiss outright
non-economic theories as inapplicable. The claim is that autonomy theories are not useful in understanding contracts by corporations because
such theories assume that contracting parties are human beings. Ultimately, this argument necessarily invokes a particular theory-or set of
theories-about the nature of corporations. These theories, however,
have been largely repudiated by contemporary economic analysis. Ironically, contemporary law and economics explicitly assumes a model of
the corporation that is particularly hospitable to the very theories that the
proponents of the new lex mercatoriahope to dismiss once and for all.

6. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract,46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933).
7.
See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1942).
8.
For an idiosyncratic but influential account of this earlier discussion see Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (arguing that the
discussion of contract law represented a competition between individualistic and altruistic visions of
the law).
9. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 920 (Mich. 1887) (discussing a contract to
sell a cow named Rose); Texaco Inc. v. Penzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987) (discussing
a contract to sell the Getty Oil Company).
10. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54 (Jody S. Kraus &

Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contracts Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
11.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 544.
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The failure to banish autonomy theories from the new lex mercatoria illustrates the difficulty of reconciling autonomy and welfare theories
by dismissing one approach all together. Scholars interested in a coherent theory of contracts would be better served by finding ways of integrating the two approaches in some principled fashion.' 2 Hence, any
advantage of the new lex mercatoria must lie in its ability to make the
integration of autonomy and welfare theories into a single approach more
tractable.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some theoretical
background on the conflict between autonomy and efficiency theories of
contract and the attempts to reconcile them. In Part II, I provide a fully
developed version of the argument for dismissing autonomy theories
from the discussion of contracts between corporations. Part III examines
the various theories of the corporation inherent in that argument. In Part
IV, I argue that these theories of the corporation are inconsistent with
efficiency theories of contract and that the preferred conception of the
corporation among law and economics scholars-the nexus of contracts
theory--can be reconciled with autonomy theories. In Part V, I illustrate
the application of the nexus of contracts theory of the corporation to
autonomy-based arguments about contracts between corporations using
the example of contract interpretation. This article concludes with some
observations on attempts to reconcile autonomy and efficiency drawn
from the arguments over corporations and contracts.
I. THE PREDICAMENT OF CONTEMPORARY CONTRACT THEORY AND THE
NEW LEXMERCTORIA

A. ReconcilingAutonomy and Efficiency
Contemporary legal philosophy is essentially divided about the basis of contractual obligation. On one side are autonomy theorists who
claim that contracts represent a form of self-determination and ought to
be enforced as a way of respecting and increasing human freedom. On
the other side are efficiency theorists who argue that voluntary transactions increase aggregate levels of social welfare and ought to be enforced
as a way of increasing wealth and utility.' 3 The autonomy theories are
12.
For my own attempt to offer such an approach see Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in
ContractLaw, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1483 (2005).
13.
There are of course theorists who seek to avoid this conflict by adopting a largely contextual, atheoretical, and ad hoc approach to contract law. These theorists deny that contract law can or
should be understood to embody a consistent theory. It is enough that it provides pragmatic solutions to the concrete problems that it finds itself faced with. See also Robert Hillman, The Crisis in
Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103 (1988) (arguing that a pragmatic model of contract
law displays the complexity of the theory). See generally HILLMAN, supra note 2. For example,
Jean Braucher has written, "I remain a skeptic about the need for and the wisdom of a unified field
theory of contract, particularly a one-dimensional one; a good gray compromise statement of competing concerns will probably do." Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism:The Regulatory Role of ContractLaw, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 701 n. 14 (1990). For a discussion of the
conflict between theory and pragmatism in contract law scholarship see Oman, supra note 12, at
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deontological, while the efficiency theories are consequentialist, and
therein lies the problem. As one philosopher has observed:
As normative theories, economic contract theories would seem to be
logically incompatible with autonomy contract theories for the same
reason that consequentialist moral theories are logically incompatible
with deontological moral theories: The former claim that moral justification is solely a function of consequences, while the latter claim
that moral justification is logically independent of consequences. 14
Without some way of reconciling or adjudicating between these competing approaches, contract theory is deeply incoherent. So long as the
theories converge on the same conclusions, this is a logical but not a
practical problem. However, when the theories diverge 15 or when one
16
theory fails to generate any concrete answers to particular questions,
the absence of a unified approach presents real problems. 17 We are unable to specify or confidently justify the rules of contract law.' 8
There are two potential strategies for reconciling these differing
theories of contract law. The first approach is the "horizontal independ-

1483-84. In addition, James Gordley and others have argued for a neo-scholastic vision of contract
based on the idea of equality in exchange. James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547
(1995). See also James Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 85 (2002).
14.
Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical
Integration Strategy, in SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 420, 420 (Ernest Sosa &
Enrique Villanueva eds. 2001).
15.

Compare, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 130-32 (4th ed. 1992)

(arguing against specific performance on economic grounds), with Randy Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 179 (1986) (arguing in favor of a default rule of
specific performance based on an autonomy theory of contract). See generally TREBILCOCK, supra
note 2, at 242 ("On the various central normative issues pertaining to the concept of freedom of
contract, I have concluded that the claim of convergence between autonomy and welfare values is
much more tenuous than proponents of the private ordering paradigm have conventionally been
prepared to acknowledge.").
16.
See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,88
MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989) (arguing that autonomy theories produce no determinate answer to the
question of what sorts of default rules the law of contract should include).
17.
Peter Benson has observed:
Contemporary scholars often assume that the juxtaposition of a plurality of different
moral conceptions in an account of law is unproblematic. Indeed, they frequently judge it
to be desirable, because they think that the deployment of a multiplicity of conceptions
enables a theory to accommodate the richness and the complexity of the subject matter
under investigation. If, however, the invocation of different moral conceptions is to provide a coherent and stable account of the basis of contract, it is essential that these diverse
conceptions function as integrated parts of an articulated and therefore intelligible whole.
Otherwise, the plurality of conceptions will constitute only an unresolved chaos which
cannot explain anything, whether simple or complex.
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel
and ContemporaryContract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1085-86 (1989).
18.

See Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118,

118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) ("In common law jurisdictions at least, there is at present no generally
accepted theory or even family of theories of contract."); cf Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 543
("Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the law is, nor a complete
normative theory, explaining what the law should be.").

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

ence" strategy. 19 We can claim that autonomy approaches and efficiency

approaches are actually theories about different things. Since both purport to be theories of contract law, this claim is puzzling. There are,
however, several different sorts of legal theories. A theory could justify
legal rules 20 or provide an explanation of a field of law. 2 1 Alternatively,

a theory could aim simply at predicting actual case outcomes. 22 For example, Jody Kraus claims that autonomy theories seek to explain the

doctrinal arguments of judges. 23 In contrast, he argues, efficiency theories seek to explain the outcomes of particular cases irrespective of the
stated reasons of the judges.24 Hence the different theories are in fact
explaining different things.
The second approach is the "vertical integration" strategy. 25 This
strategy "contemplate[s] . . . that both approaches may be combined as

logically distinct components of a unified theory.,

26

They are reconciled

by arranging the two approaches hierarchically. There are two ways that

this can be done. First, one can show that autonomy is lexically superior
to efficiency or vice versa, so that the normative criteria are logically

distinct but one of them "trumps" the other. For example, I have argued
elsewhere that one should pursue efficiency so long as it does not con-

flict with autonomy. 27 When such conflicts arise, the demands of efficiency must give way to the demands of autonomy.28

Alternatively,

19.
See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and ContractLaw: Groundworkfor the Reconciliation
of Autonomy and Efficiency, I SOC. POL. & L. PHIL. 385, 390-422 (2002) ("Part II: Horizontal
Independence"). I borrow the terminology "horizontal independence" and "vertical integration" in
this section from Kraus. See also Kraus, ReconcilingEfficiency and Autonomy, supranote 14.
20.
Kraus, Legal Theory and ContractLaw, supranote 19, at 400-02.
21.
Id. at 395-99. For the most elaborate attempt to date to provide such an internal interpretation of contract law, see generally SMITH, supranote 2.
22.
Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law, supra note 19, at 400. By prediction, Kraus
seems to mean something like a theory that generates accurate forecasts of case outcomes without
necessarily providing a phenomenologically accurate account of legal reasoning or legal justifications. There are obvious parallels between this conception of explanation and Milton Friedman's
defense of unrealistic assumptions in economics. According to Friedman, the inaccuracy of the
assumptions is irrelevant so long as the predictions were empirically correct. See Ernest Nagel,
Assumptions in Economic Theory, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION 130, 130-38 (Alan

Ryan ed., 1973) (discussing Friedman's argument that unrealistic assumptions are valid in economic
theories if they produce accurate predictions). See generallyALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 74-79 (1988) (discussing instrumentalism in economics). Analogously, Kraus
envisions theories that provide inaccurate descriptions of legal doctrine but correctly predict who
wins or loses the case.
23. See Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
URISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 689-90 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,

2002).
24. Id.
25. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 422.
26. Id.
27.
Oman, supra note 14, at 1499.
28. Id. at 1499-1506 (arguing for the lexical priority of liberty in contract law). Kraus suggests that under a lexical ordering of competing theories the lexically prior theory can be thought of
as authorizing but not requiring the lexically subordinate theory. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 42022. As an example of this approach, he cites Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAw 86 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). See id. at 437 n.6.
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Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell take the opposite position, claiming
that "parties need to be induced to perform their contracts when performance would be beneficial, but should not be encouraged to perform when
doing so would reduce their well-being." 29 The second "vertical integration" strategy is to argue that one approach is foundational while the
other is derivative. For example, Frank Buckley has argued that autonomy theories can actually be reduced to consequentialist theories. 3 According to Buckley, autonomy theories necessarily invoke the convention
of promising.31 Yet the desirability of the convention must be based on
consequentialist reasoning, because we cannot invoke a promise to abide
by the convention of promising without falling into circularity. 32 Hence,
autonomy is really an implication of consequentialism. As we shall see
shortly, one can also argue that efficiency is an implication of autonomy.
B. The New Lex Mercatoria
Recently, some commercial law scholars have sought to reconcile
the conflict by narrowing their focus from contracts in general to purely
commercial transactions. The idea that the law should make a distinction
between business obligations and other obligations has a long history.
Roman law created a special class of "innominate contracts" that allowed
certain kinds of business transactions, such as sales (emptio venditio) and
partnerships (societas), to be concluded without the formalities required
for other contracts.33
During the eleventh and twelfth centuries,
long-distance trade began to reemerge in western Europe, and with it
came the rise of the lex mercatoriato govern issues of sale, carriage, and
insurance.34 Nineteenth-century jurists sought to unite all voluntary obligations under a single rubric of contract, 35 but today the law still makes
subtle and not-so-subtle distinctions between business contracts and
other contracts. In the United States, the entire law of sales has been cut
off from the common law and codified in Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The U.C.C. also has a set of special rules that apply
29.
Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 156 (2002). See also
Richard Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 979, 980-81 (2002)
(discussing Kaplow and Shavell's Fairness Versus Welfare).
30. F.H. Buckley, Introduction to THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 2 (F.H.
Buckley, ed. 1999).
31.
Id. at 4-5.
32. See id.
at 5-6. Buckley's assertion that all autonomy theories of contract - what he calls
"right to contract" theories - can be dismissed by this kind of argument is a bit premature, since
there are autonomy theories of contract that do not invoke the convention of promising. Buckley's
failure to address non-promissory autonomy theories of contract is odd given the fact that Randy
Barnett had offered a more or less fully articulated version of such a theory long before Buckley's
essay appeared. See Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
33.
See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 171, 185 (1962).
34.

See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 333-34 (1983).

35.
See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). Gilmore's thesis has
been famously controversial on many fronts, not the least of which are his historical claims. See
James Gordley, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 452 (1975) (attacking some of Gilmore's more
extreme historical claims about the innovations of nineteenth-century theorists).
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only "between merchants., 36 According to some commercial law scholars, the idea of a lex mercatoriacan be used to attack the predicament of
contemporary contract theory.
Daniel Farber, for example, has implicitly built on this idea to offer
a vertical integration strategy, arguing that in the context of commercial
law an efficiency norm can be derived from a commitment to autonomy. 37 He invokes John Rawls's argument that the principles of justice
can be derived from what the parties in a hypothetical original position
would choose behind a veil of ignorance that keeps them from knowing
how they will personally fare under any particular set of principles.38
According to Farber, in the original position the parties would choose a
norm under which judges decided commercial law cases using efficiency. 39 Unlike earlier, more ambitious-and less persuasive--consent
arguments for efficiency, Farber limits his defense to the realm of commercial law.40 In this limited context, he argues that risk aversion, distributive justice, and catastrophic reallocations of wealth are of limited
concern and are thus unlikely to upset consensus in the original position.
Farber's argument seems to demonstrate that the task of reconciling
competing approaches to contract law becomes more tractable when the
discussion is narrowed to the context of commercial law. This turn toward a new lex mercatoria can also be used to construct arguments
showing that autonomy and efficiency are "horizontally independent."
This approach offers a more radical solution to the problem of reconciling the competing approaches by suggesting that rather than being mistaken or derivative, autonomy theories are simply irrelevant for the vast
majority of contracts.

36. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-104(3) (defining "between merchants"); 2-201(2) (relaxing slightly
the requirements of the statute of frauds between merchants); 2-207(2) (stating that additional terms
accompanying an acceptance become part of the contract between merchants); 2-209(2) (stating that
limitations on oral alterations of written contracts between merchants must be countersigned if the
writing is a form); 2-605(l)(b) (specifying special repudiation rules for contracts between merchants); 2-609(2) (stating that the reasonableness of the grounds for insecurity in contracts between
merchants is determined by commercial practice).
37. Farber, supra note 10, at 55-57.
38. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-30 (rev. ed. 1999) (setting forth the basic argument for "justice as fairness" based on the original position).
39. Farber, supra note 10, at 56-57.
40.

Id. Compare RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 92-115 (1981) (offering a

consent based justification for the "wealth maximization" norm) with JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS,
MORALS, AND THE LAW 115-22 (1988) (criticizing Posner's argument) and RONALD DWORKIN, A

MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237, 251-66 (1985) (offering a slightly different critique of Posner's argument). Posner himself has largely conceded defeat in this debate. See RICHARD POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF LEGAL AND MORAL THEORY (1999).

41.
Farber, supra note 10, at 73. He also argues that the efficiency norm should only be
pursued in commercial law when the lexically prior demands of justice generated by Rawls' theory
are satisfied. Id. at 74-75.
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II. THE ARTIFICIAL PERSONALITY ARGUMENT
A. HorizontalIndependence and the New Lex Mercatoria
In a recent article, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott offer a "horizontal independence" approach to the conflict between autonomy and efficiency by combining the idea of the lex mercatoria and economics to
offer a new theory of contract law. 42 Their core claim is that contract law
should pursue no other goal than to maximize the joint gains from transactions. 43 All other considerations should be ignored. 44 The hope that
economics can provide a master norm for contracts is not new.45 Indeed,
law and economics has had other approaches "on the run" for at least
fifteen years, if not longer. 4 What is new is the basic strategy that
Schwartz and Scott adopt. Following Farber, they seek to strengthen the
case for the primacy of economic analysis by limiting it. Thus, they
claim their theory applies only to contracts between firms.4 7 In so doing
they explicitly hark back to the lex mercatoria,8
Limiting the theory to inter-firm contracts provides a unified theory
of contract law by summarily dismissing autonomy theories. 49 Because
42.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10. Much of the rest of this paper focuses on the claim put
forward by Schwartz and Scott that autonomy theories of the corporation are inapplicable to contracts between corporations, and the arguments implicit in that claim. In fairness to them, and their
fine article, I hasten to point out that the bulk of their piece is not directed at the issue of theoretical
pluralism, but rather at working out the implications of a single-minded allegiance to the efficiency
norm. Because my primary interest here is the issue of theoretical pluralism, rather than the specific
elaborations of autonomy and efficiency theories, I focus mainly on those parts of their article that
address the issue of pluralism. I am in no way claiming that that this piece is a response to the subtle
economic arguments that make up the bulk of their article.
43.
Id. at 544.
44.
See id.
45.
See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 30, at 2 ("Not merely does law-and-economics scholarship
offer a compelling normative explanation for free contracting, but rival theories are unpersuasive.").
See also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 29, at 52-58 (arguing that welfare based theories of
contract are superior to alternatives based on promising or personal autonomy).
46.
See Kraus, supra note 23, at 687 ("As in private law scholarship generally, economic
analysis is the dominant paradigm in contemporary contracts scholarship."). Although, dating such
things is always subjective, I would point to Richard Craswell's article attacking the inability of
autonomy theories to account for the default rules of contract law as the decisive turning point in
favor of economic analysis. See Craswell, supranote 16.
47.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 544. They do not foreclose the possibility, however,
that it may apply to other contracts as well. Id. For purpose of their theory, Schwartz and Scott
define a firm as: "(1)[A]n entity that is organized in corporate form and that has five or more employees, (2) a limited partnership, or (3) a professional partnership such as a law or accounting
firm." Id. at 545.
48.
They write, "[F]or centuries [commercial law] has drawn a distinction between mercantile
contracts and others. Modem scholars have not systematically pursued the normative implications
of this ancient distinction, however. We attempt to cure this neglect by setting out the theoretical
foundations of a law merchant for our time." Id. at 550 (citation omitted).
49.
Limiting the theory to contracts between firms also makes the positive economic analysis
of contracting relationships more tractable. Many non-economists doubt that the rational actor
model of modem law and economics can provide an adequate epistemological framework for legal
theory. Behavioralists object to simple theories of utility maximization, pointing to evidence of
systematic cognitive biases that seem to falsify the basic assumptions of the rational actor model.
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998); and Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endow-
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all of the agents in this realm are corporations, autonomy theories based
on a commitment to individual freedom are inapplicable. 50 "These answers are ruled out ... because business firms that make commercial
contracts are artificial persons whose autonomy the state need not respect
on moral grounds, and whose morality is ordinarily required by positive
law.",51 If this move is justified, then Schwartz and Scott may have found
the holy grail of contemporary contracts scholarship: A unified theory of
contract law. As they point out, most interpersonal agreements and
firm-to-person agreements are not governed by the law of contracts.52
While human beings may make contracts, most of their voluntary relations are governed by employment law, real estate law, family law, or
consumer protection law. 53 Thus, even if a theory of firm-to-firm contracts is not a complete account of contract law, it would cover the lion's
share of contracts in the real world.
B. Autonomy Theories and the Corporation
Unfortunately, Schwartz and Scott do not provide any more details
about why the artificial nature of the corporate person vitiates autonomy
theories of firm-to-firm contracts. In the remainder of this section, I will
flesh out this argument, explicitly articulating the case for banishing
autonomy theories from the discussion of the new lex mercatoria. I shall
call this line of reasoning the Artificial Personality Argument. Because
they refer to this argument rather than explicitly developing it, what follows is not exposition but original analysis. Nevertheless, the Artificial
Personality Argument lies at the bottom of the common intuition that
autonomy theories cannot apply to contracts by corporations. While I
ultimately conclude that the Artificial Personality Argument is a failure,
in laying it out I try to make the strongest case possible for it, and in the
end I believe that it stands as a real challenge to autonomy theories rather
than as a straw man that can easily be brushed aside.
The Artificial Personality Argument is based on the philosophical
assumptions of contemporary autonomy theories. 54 The works of
Charles Fried and Randy Barnett provide two of the more widely discussed examples of autonomy approaches and briefly sketching their
ment Effects Within CorporateAgency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002). Because firms,

however, are profit maximizing institutions rather than actual persons, one can argue that in the
limited context of corporate behavior, the critiques of the rational actor model, whatever their force
elsewhere, are quite weak. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 550-51. Schwartz and Scott acknowledge that agency costs and cognitive biases may also distort firm behavior, causing them to
deviate from the predictions of a pure rational actor model. However, they are optimistic that competition and corporate mortality largely weed out these problems. See id at 551 & n.18 (responding
to behavioral law and economics literature on corporate behavior).
50. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 556.
51.
Id.
52. Id. at 544.
53. See id.
54. See id.
at 556 n.25.
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theories will illuminate the Artificial Personality Argument.5 Both of
these theorists justify and explain contract law by arguing that it represents a commitment to the value of individual liberty.5 6 According to
Fried, the basis of contract is the enforcement of promises. 57 He goes on
to argue that "[t]he obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in ar58
guments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust. 59
Individual autonomy, in turn, rests on what he calls the "liberal ideal."
According to Fried this is the principle that "whatever we accomplish
and however that accomplishment is judged, morality requires that we
respect the person and property of others, leaving them free to make their
lives as we are left free to make ours.,, 60 Fried's "liberal principle" essentially restates the traditional distinction between the right and the
good. In liberal political philosophy, the right defines the sphere in
which people are free to pursue their own ends free of coercion. The
good represents the ideals and ends that people use their freedom to pursue. 6 ' According to Fried, promising provides us with a way of enlisting
the help of others in the pursuit of our vision of the good without violating their rights.62 At the same time, breaking a promise violates the "liberal principle," treating the disappointed promisee as a mere means to the
promisor's ends. 63 For Fried, contract law is simply the legal instantiation of this set of moral principles.
Fried's theory is open to a number of objections. Its focus on the
will of the promisor seems to commit it to subjective theories of contract
formation and interpretation, both of which have been rejected by the
common law and present practical problems. 64 In addition, contract as
promise commits the law to enforcing principles of personal morality,
55.

CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

(1981); Barnett, supra note 32. Other examples are summarized in Peter Benson, Contracts, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).

56.
FRIED, supra note 55, at 2, and Barnett, supra note 32, at 306.
57.
FRIED, supra note 55, at 2-4.
58. Id. at 16.
59. Id.at 7.
60.
FRIED, supra note 55, at 7.
61.
"[L]iberals ...draw a distinction between the 'right' and the 'good' - between a framework of basic rights and liberties, and the conceptions of the good that people may choose to pursue
within the framework." Michael Sandel, Introductionto LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 3 (Michael
Sandel, ed. 1984). For further discussions of the distinction, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE §§ 5-6, 48, 68, 84 (rev. ed. Oxford University Press 1999) and BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 8-19 (1980).

62. FRIED, supra note 55, at 8.
63. See FRIED, supra note 55, at 16-17 ("By virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust and
respect, it is wrong to invoke that convention in order to make a promise, and then break it.").
64. See, e.g., Robbins v. Lynch, 836 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) ("You
can't escape contractual obligation by signing with your fingers crossed behind your back, even if
that clearly shows your intent not to be bound."), Billmyre v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Sisters of Charity, 331 A.2d 313, 316 (Md. 1975) ("When language of a contract is clear, the true test of what is
meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the
position of the parties would have thought it meant."). See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 118-127, 137-139, 148-152, 503-505 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the role of the objective theory in the contemporary law of contracts).
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which apparently conflicts with the liberal principles that Fried invokes.65 In response, Barnett has proposed an autonomy theory based on
the alienation of rights rather than the sanctity of promising.6 6 Barnett
begins his argument by invoking a version of Fried's "liberal principle":
The function of ... [a] theory based on individual rights is to define
the boundaries within which individuals may live,67act, and pursue
happiness free of the forcible interference of others.
Barnett dispenses with Fried's complex gyrations around promising
and its autonomy-extending powers.6 8 Rather, he looks to how rights are
acquired and transferred. 69 While arguing that certain rights are inalienable,'( Barnett claims that most rights can be transferred by their holders
to others. 71 Within the liberal framework, consent becomes the touchstone for the transfer of rights precisely because rights are meant to define the sphere within which an individual is entitled to live her life free
of coercion. 72 Contract law thus becomes the legal mechanism that facilitates and polices the consensual transfer of rights. Most contracts
involve a commitment to some future action. This temporal aspect poses
a potential embarrassment to Barnett's consent theory, which seems to
reduce contracting to conveyancing. It is also part of what makes the
promissory theory attractive. Promises are by definition commitments to
some future action. A consent theory of contract, however, has the same
advantage so long as one can conceptualize future performance as a kind
of alienable present entitlement.7 3

65. See SMITH, supranote 2, at 69. Furthermore, Smith writes:
The reason it is said to be illegitimate for the state to enforce promises qua promises is
that doing so is inconsistent with the 'harm principle.' This foundational principle of
modem liberalism... holds that it is illegitimate for the state to interfere with an individual's liberty unless that individual has harmed... another individual.
Id.; Randy Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1025
(1991) ("[A] moral theory of promising, standing alone, would have courts enforcing purely moral
commitments, which is tantamount to legislating virtue."). Schwartz and Scott seem to be implicitly
alluding to this point when they note that the morality of corporate behavior is already required by
the non-contract law. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 556. But see Thomas Scanlon, Promises
and Contracts,in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 86 (Peter Benson, ed. 2001) (rejecting the argument that enforcing promises is an illegitimate exercise morality enforcement).
66. See Barnett, supra note 32, at 271-74 (criticizing will theories of contract and promissory
theories of contract).
67. Barnett, supra note 32, at 291.
68. See generally id.
69. See generally id.
70. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CONTRACT LAW 70 (Randy E. Barnett, ed., 2d ed. 2001).
71.
Barnett, supra note 32, at 293 ("The subjects of most rights transfer agreements are entitlements that are indisputably alienable.").
72. See id. at 296-300 (discussing consent as the moral basis for the transfer of rights).
73.

See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 73 (1995).

The

possibility of conceptualizing promises of future action as transfer of a presently existing entitlement
is perhaps the chief internal weakness of transfer theories like Bamett's. Stephen Smith has trenchantly summarized the argument, writing:
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Despite their important differences, these theories are both
grounded in the moral assumptions of liberal individualism. 74 Liberalism
takes the individual human being as the basic unit of moral calculus, and
then deduces moral theories from this basic assumption. Both promise
and consent theories see the autonomy of individuals as providing a
normative justification for the law of contracts. With these individualistic assumptions clearly in view, we can understand the nature of the Artificial Personality Argument and the dismissal of autonomy theories from
the new lex mercatoria.
According to the Artificial Personality Argument, applying autonomy theories to corporate contracts is a category mistake. In justifying
respect for the autonomy of others, Immanuel Kant wrote:
Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an
end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by
this or that will. He must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or to 76
other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time
as an end.

Kant's formulation makes explicit that respect for autonomy is tied
to the humanity of the rights-bearer. 77 Liberals do not respect the autonomy of rocks precisely because rocks are not human beings. According
to the Artificial Personality Argument corporations are like rocks rather

The conceptual objection to transfer theories is that it is not possible for contracting parties to do what such theories suppose they are doing when they make a contract. More
specifically, the objection is that the rights that transfer theories suppose are transferred
by contracts do not exist prior to the making of contracts .... I have the right to give or
not give you my watch next Thursday. But a contract in which I agree to deliver my
watch to you next Thursday cannot be regarded as transferring that liberty right to you.
SMITH, supra note 2, at 101.
74. The link between autonomy-based arguments for freedom of contract and liberalism has,
however, been questioned by some self-proclaimed liberal theorists. See, e.g., Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract,21 OXFORD J. OF L. STUD. 473 (2001) (arguing that the
version of perfectionist liberalism articulated by Joseph Raz justifies significant restrictions on
contractual freedom). See also DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT (2003). Stephen Smith,
for example, links what he calls "rights-based theories" (autonomy theories in this article) with
liberal individualism, writing:
Rights-based theories of contract typically understand rights in the traditional 'Kantian'
sense. Rights, in this view, reflect the classically individualistic values ....
[lit is expressed in the idea that the foundation of rights is individualist. These foundations are
typically regarded as either the protection of specifically individual interests (say an interest in owning property or achieving personal autonomy), or, following Kant again, as
flowing from a particular conception of human agency. It would be inappropriate, in this
view, to explain our rights as grounded in, say, utilitarian considerations of general welfare.
SMITH, supra note 2, at 141.
75.
See, e.g., STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 14

(1992) ("The idea that society, and particularly its political arrangements, can be understood as... a
contract between individuals has been a major theme in the history of liberal thought.").
76.

IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35 (James W.

Ellington, trans. 1981) (1785).
77. Id.
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than people.78 Autonomy theories of contract cannot justify the contract
law applying to corporations precisely because such theories are deeply
grounded in respect for human beings as free definers of their own
lives.7 9 Corporations are not human beings and are not entitled to be
treated as ends rather than means. Morality does not require "leaving
them free to make their lives as we are left free to make ours." 80 To
paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist, the claim of the Artificial Personality Argument is that autonomy theories are concerned with "the liberty of
natural, not artificial persons." 8' Seen in these terms, the Artificial Personality Argument is a "horizontal independence" strategy that purports
to demonstrate that firm-to-firm contracts are a separate phenomenon
about which autonomy theories have nothing to say.
Once we explicitly state the Artificial Personality Argument, it becomes clear that it stands or falls based on one's theory of the corporation. If corporations really are fundamentally different than natural persons, then concern for human autonomy tells us nothing about the law
governing their contracts. On the other hand, if the distinction between
natural persons and corporations can be collapsed, then autonomy theories can be used to understand firm-to-firm contract law and the basic
problem of theoretical pluralism remains. If the Artificial Personality
Argument fails, we must look elsewhere for a reconciliation. In the next
section, I turn to theories of the corporation that could support the Artificial Personality Argument.
III. ARTIFICIAL PERSONALITY THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION

The Artificial Personality Argument rests on the assumption that
corporations are not human beings. We must be wary of metaphors. It is
easy to speak of "soulless corporations" or "impersonal" firms, but if one
looks at the functioning of any corporation, what one sees are actual human beings. Even shell corporations that exist only as file folders and
tax shelters have their documents handled by digits attached to human
hands. The Wall Street Journal regularly reports on the contracts that
corporations have "signed" with one another, but it also mentions the
human beings that actually put pen to paper. 83 Thus, the Artificial Personality Argument cannot literally rely on the claim that corporate contracts are not the acts of human beings. Rather, it must rest on some
78. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 556.
79. Cf Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1236 (1983).
80. Cf FRIED, supra note 55, at 7.
81.
Cf First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting) (quoting Northwestern National Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906)).
82.

Cf LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 194 (2d ed. 1985).

83.
See, e.g., James Bandler, Losing Focus: As Kodak Eyes Digital Future, A Big Partner
Starts to Fade, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2004 at A1 (discussing contracts signed by Walgreens, Kodak,
and Fuji), Healthcare Brief WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2004 at A10 (discussing contracts signed by
RiteAid, Corp.).
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concept of the corporation that explains why the activity of corporate
agents signing contracts is morally different than the activity of two
neighbors clinching a deal at a yard sale. The Artificial Personality Argument contends that autonomy theories of contract cannot apply to corporate contracts because to do so would be nonsensical from the point of
view of the autonomy theories themselves. Thus in order to make the
Artificial Personality Argument coherent, we need some concept of the
corporation that renders the human activity of the corporation unworthy
of the kind of moral respect demanded by autonomy theories.
There are three basic theories about the nature of corporations: the
the concession theory, and the fiction theory. The real theory
theory,
real
claims that corporations are the legal expression of organic groups or
other supra-individual entities and should be understood as having a will
and an existence that cannot be reduced to the sum of their collective
parts.84 The concession theory claims that the corporation is a creation of
the state that exercises delegated authority to serve the purposes of the
government, even when that purpose is "private" business. The fiction
theory claims that the corporation is nothing more than a collection of
individuals and that the language of corporations is little more than a
useful shorthand referring to a complex set of individual rights and obligations.86 None of these theories has ever completely dominated the law
of corporations, and one can find traces of each theory in the reported
cases. Hence, it is difficult, if not impossible, to match particular theories with different jurisdictions or different periods. Throughout history,
they have existed side by side in the law, taking on different names and
different nuances of meaning. 87 They have been combined and confused
with one another in various ways, but the basic claims demonstrate a
remarkable continuity.
In the remainder of this section, I shall argue that the Artificial Personality Argument can employ both the real and the concession theory.
In the next section, I will argue that the Artificial Personality Argument
cannot use the fiction theory, and that such a theory can be employed by
autonomy theories to understand the nature of corporate contracts.
A. The Real Theory of Corporations
Although the real theory of the corporation has almost disappeared
from discussions of corporate law, at one time it was an important posi-

84.
ST. U. L.
85.
86.
87.

See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraisingthe Real Entity Theory of the Corporation,21 FLA.
REv. 1061, 1068 (1994).
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1064.
See id. at 1064-65.
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tion in corporate jurisprudence.8 8 Writing at the end of the nineteenth
century, Ernst Freund summarized the position, stating:
Above the existence of the individual there is the existence of the
species, and the corporation is nothing but the legal expression of this
fact, which appears as a reality in the physical person, so the higher
will of the species is embodied in numerous and various forms of association, and as a result we find, beside the individual, entities of a
higher order endowed with volition and acting capacity. And where
the law recognizes such embodied
will as a person, we have a juristic
9
corporation.8
a
or
person
There are two key ideas in this theory. The first is that the legal form of
the corporation recognizes an already existing community. One way in
which this concept manifests itself legally is through the doctrine of
"corporation by prescription." 90 At common law, a community-such as
a town-which operated as an entity for a long period of time could become a legal person without a formal charter of incorporation. 9' The
second key idea is that corporate bodies are possessed of a collective will
that cannot be reduced to the individual wills of the members of the corporation.
The real theory of the corporation received its most forceful statement in German legal thought. Nineteenth-century German jurists were
eager to find authentically German legal traditions in contrast to the foreign influences of the Roman law.92 Otto Gierke became the proponent
of this approach in the context of corporate law.93 According to Gierke,
the indigenous, pre-Roman German law had a thick notion of corporate
existence, what Gierke called Genossenshaft.94 In contrast to the thin,
88.

See MORTON HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 67

(2001) ("For almost forty years after 1890 American jurists, like their German French, and English
counterparts, were preoccupied with the theory of legal personality.").
89.
ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS 13 (Chicago, The Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1897).
90. One of the earliest recorded cases dealing with this doctrine was Lord Coke's opinion in
The Case of Sutton's Hospital, where he wrote that if "before time of memory foundation was made
..foundation is taken for incorporation." 10 Coke's Rep. 23a, 33a (Kings Bench, 1612) reprinted
in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 347, 372 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
91.
See, e.g., Town of Juliaetta v. Smith, 85 P. 923, 924 (Idaho 1906) (municipal corporation
may exist by prescription from long use even if the formalities of incorporation were not complied
with); Worley v. Harris, 82 Ind. 493, 496 (1882) ("The exercise of corporate powers over a place for
twenty years, with knowledge on the part of the public, is conclusive evidence ...of a corporation
by prescription."); Bassett v. Porter, 58 Mass. 487, 492-93 (1849) (stating that an entity of long
standing may be presumed to have a legal existence even if no record of incorporation exists). As
these cases - especially Bassett - show, corporations by prescription were frequently created by
recourse to the legal fiction that a charter had been granted at some point in the past but inadvertently lost.
92.
See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 320-25 (1992) (discussing the work of nineteenth-century German jurists of the so-called "Historical School").
93.
See OTrO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederick William Maitland trans., 1900) (Beacon Press 1958).
94.
See id.at 37 ("It is a distinctive trait of medieval doctrine that within every human group
it decisively recognizes an aboriginal and active Right of the group taken as a Whole.").
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Roman theory that a corporation was nothing more than a legal fiction,
Gierke argued that historically German law recognized the organic existence of the group. 95 Corporations, he argued, are the legal manifestation
of communities possessed of a collective spirit. 96 Hence, the acts of a
corporation are not the mere aggregation of the individual acts of its
members, but rather should be understood as being qualitatively different. Gierke's treatise became influential in common law countries by
virtue of a translation by Frederick Maitland. 97 Maitland and others argued that in numerous instances the common law acknowledged the real
existence of collectives and treated their actions as what they were-the
choices of organic groups, even when the groups were not formally incorporated. They took this as evidence that in practice the common law,
whatever the rhetoric of its judges and lawyers, contained elements of the
real theory.9 8
The real theory of the corporation is largely forgotten today, but
Meir Dan-Cohen has adopted a position very similar to it, albeit one
shorn on Gierke's Hegelianism. 99 Dan-Cohen presents his theory
through a hypothetical. 100 Imagine a regular company with human managers and employees who make widgets. 10 ' One day the managers decide to mechanize the company's production completely. 0 2 All of the
employees are fired and replaced with widget-making machines. 10 3 This
move to automation proves so productive that the shareholders vote to
replace management with computers.' 4 The computers then decide to
alter the firm's capital structure, and the corporation purchases all of its
outstanding shares of stock in a buy back, leaving a fully functioning
corporation bereft of any human beings at all. 10 5 According to
See id.
95.
96. Id.
97. See HORWITZ, supra note 88, at 71-72 (discussing Maitland's influence on the debates
over corporate theory).
98. See Frederick William Maitland, Introduction to OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF
THE MIDDLE AGES vii (Frederick William Maitland trans., 1900) (Beacon Press 1958); Frederick
Pollock, Has the Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations?,27 L.Q. REV. 219
(1911). The sorts of acknowledgments of organic group life pointed out by Maitland continue to
exist in American law. Id. Thus, American law routinely treats unincorporated associations as
persons, implicitly acknowledging according to Maitland's argument, the "real" status of these
groups. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8471(4) (2005) (defining "person" under the Federal Retirement Thrift
Investment Management System to include "unincorporated association"); 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(iv)
(2005) (defining "corporation" under the bankruptcy laws to include an "unincorporated company or
association"); 12 U.S.C. § 375b(9)(A)(i) (2005) (noting that an "association" or "unincorporated
organization" can violate Federal Reserve Board regulations); 15 U.S.C. §17 (2005) (noting that
"unincorporated associations" can be sued by major league baseball players for anti-trust violations).
99.

THEORY
100.
101.
102.
103.

See generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL

FOR THE BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 47-51 (1986).
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.

104.

Id.

105.

Id.
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Dan-Cohen, "[t]he displacement of human management by computers
would ... have little effect on both the actual operations and the legal
status of [the corporation].' ' 6 The only thing that makes the hypothetical implausible is the demands it places on computer technology not on
legal theory.' 0 7 The ease with which we can imagine fitting such a personless corporation into our existing laws suggests than corporations
should be treated as sui generis.
Regardless of whether one conceptualizes the real theory in the
terms of Gierke or Dan-Cohen, it fits the needs of the Artificial Personality Argument. Gierke's Genossenshafi may be entitled to some kind of
respect and autonomy, but such requirements cannot be specified using
contemporary autonomy theories. The liberalism upon which the autonomy theories rely is essentially individualistic. To borrow the words of
Gierke, in liberal thought there is "a drift, which makes for a theoretical
concentration of right and power in the highest and widest group on the
one hand and the individual man on the other, at the cost of all intermediate groups.' 0 8 Genossenshaft is thus outside the categories of liberal
theory. Dan-Cohen, as a contemporary of Barnett and Fried, is even
more explicit:
The negative answer to the question... [of] whether or not organizations can have original autonomy rights of their own . . . follows
simply and straightforwardly from combining the ethical individualism of the paradigm of autonomy with our description
of organiza09
tions [in the computerized company hypothetical].
Because corporations qua corporations can exist independent of any human members they cannot be endowed with rights based on notions of
human dignity. It does not follow from this that corporations are entitled
to no rights. Such rights, however, including presumably the right to
contract, 1 0 must be based on some sort of consequentialism. '

106.
107.
demands
108.
109.

Id. at 48.
See id. Indeed, Dan-Cohen does not even believe that his hypothetical places unrealistic
on computer technology. Id
GIERKE, supra note 93, at 87.
DAN-CoHEN, supra note 99, at 61.

110.
See id. at 98-102 (discussing contract remedies within the context of Dan-Cohen's theory).
111.
Id. at 80 ("[fIt is clear that as far as derivative rights are concerned the utilitarian is indifferent whether the right bearing unit is an individual human being or a Personless Corporation.").
Not surprisingly, Dan-Cohen's version of the "real theory" is particularly hospitable to the Artificial
Personality Argument when it is employed by economic partisans like Schwartz and Scott. Id.
Indeed, he anticipates the basic approach of Schwartz and Scott, if not the details of their particular
economic arguments. Id. He mirrors the individual-individual, individual-organization, organization-organization typology presented by Schwartz and Scott, and like them argues that in organization-organization transactions in particular considerations of utility should dominate. See id. at 191.
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B. The Concession Theory of Corporations
In contrast to the marginal place of the real theory in English-speaking jurisprudence, 1 2 the concession theory flows naturally
from the history of Anglo-American corporate law and is a prominent
feature of much of the doctrinal discussion of that law.11 3 Stated sucthat exercise authority
cinctly, it claims that corporations
14 are institutions
delegated to them by the state.'
Some of the very first business corporations were the royal charter
companies of Elizabethan England.' 5 These corporations were created
by a special charter from the crown that gave them not only corporate
existence but also a monopoly over some aspect of commerce.1 1 6 The
Royal East India Company neatly illustrates the state-like functions of
these companies." 7 This corporation was responsible for the entire English conquest of the Indian subcontinent. 1 8 At the zenith of its power it
ruled the entire country and administered a "private" army of 260,000
troops, more than twice the size of the British Army of the time." 9 Indeed, India--or some portion of it-was formally ruled by the East India
when it turned the government
Company for over a century until 1858,
120
of the subcontinent over to the Crown.
Although less dramatic, the early history of America also illustrates
the quasi-public status of early corporations. The earliest corporations
operating in America were some of the colonies themselves. For example, both Massachusetts and Virginia were self-governing corporations
created by the grant of a charter. 12 1 During the colonial period, there
were only a tiny handful of business corporations created by the colonial
legislatures, 22 and municipal corporations were only slightly more
See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: CriticalPerspectives
112.
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490-91 (1989) (describing the short life of the "real theory"

in American jurisprudence).
Id.
113.
114. Id. ("Like government authorities, managers exercise their power by means of a rationalized system of control and administration like the government, the 'public' firm was a 'political'
entity.").
See generally W.S. Holdsworth, English CorporationLaw in the 16th and 17th Centuries,
115.
31 YALE L.J. 382 (1921) (discussing corporations law during the Elizabethan period).
116.
See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY
OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 21 (2003).
But see Ron Harris, The Formationof the East India Company as a Deal Between Entre117.
(last
preneurs and Outside Investors, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=567941
visited Sept. 30, 2005) (offering a contractual account of the formation of the East India company).
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at28.
121.
1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2 n.3 (1999 & Supp. 2005) (noting that Virginia was incorporated in 1606 and
Massachusetts in 1629).
122.
Simeon Baldwin, American Business CorporationsBefore 1789, 8 AM. HIST. REV. 449,
450 (1903) (listing the six corporate charters granted by colonies for businesses before the Revolu-

tion).
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common. 12 3 With independence, however, states began granting more
corporate charters, but they did so mainly to further quasi-public goals
such as the construction of bridges or canals and the charters frequently
granted monopolies. 124 The bulk of businesses continued to operate as
sole proprietorships, partnerships, or unincorporated joint-stock companies. 125 Although the first general incorporation statute was passed by
North Carolina in 1795,126 most corporations continued to be formed by
special acts of the legislature
that gave to individual corporations specific
27
powers and rights.1
Although there was agitation to open up the corporate form during
the Jacksonian period, 28 it wasn't until after the Civil War that the corporation became the dominant form of business organization in America. 129 The change came with general incorporation statutes that issued
charters to corporations for "any lawful purpose.' 130 Even those corporations, however, continued to be conceptualized as concessions from the
state. For example, in his first inaugural address as governor of New
Jersey, Woodrow Wilson reaffirmed that "[a] corporation exists, not of
natural right, but only by license of law, and the law ... is responsible
for what it creates." 131 Today, the language of delegated power continues to pervade the legal language surrounding corporations. 32 For ex123.
Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1096 (1980) ("Prior to
the Revolution there were only about twenty incorporated cities in America.").
124.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 188-89. "[P]eople in 1800 identified corporations with
franchise monopolies." Id.at 194.
125.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 190 ("Until ... the middle of the [nineteenth] century,
the corporation was by no means the dominant form of business organization."); Paul G. Mahoney,
Contract or Concession?An Essay on the History of CorporateLaw, 34 GA. L. REv. 873, 886-90
(2000) (chronicling the use of unincorporated joint-stock companies prior to the passage of general
incorporation statutes). See also FLETCHER, supra note 121, § 2 ("[M]ost of the business of the
period [early American history] being transacted by unincorporated joint stock companies more in
the nature of limited partnerships.").
126.
See D. Gordon Smith, The ShareholderPrimacyNorm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 295-96 (1998)
("In 1795, North Carolina adopted perhaps the first incorporation statute in the United States, granting canal builders the right of eminent domain under certain conditions and the power to 'sue and be
sued, plead and be impleaded, under the denomination of the canal company."').
127.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 188 ("In the early 19th century . . . the legislature
granted charters by statute, one by one."). In addition, Congress incorporated some businesses by
special statutes, perhaps most notably in the nineteenth century, the Union Pacific Railroad Company. See Act of July 1, 1862, 37 Cong. Ch. 120, July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489 (incorporating Union
Pacific).
128.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 82, at 194-95 (discussing Jacksonian agitation over corporations).
129.
Id.at 511 ("By 1870 corporations had a commanding position in the economy.").
130.
New York seems to have been the first state to adopt such a law in 1866. See 1866 N.Y.
Laws 1896.
131.
Quoted in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 n.37 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132.
See, e.g., Allen v. Malvern Country Club, 746 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Ark. 1988) ("Corporations organized under the laws of this state are but creatures of the legislature"); Sahara Grotto &
Styx, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 261 N.E.2d 873, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (stating that
corporations possess powers delegated to them by the statutes of their incorporation). The extent to
which this delegation language continues to have meaning in an age of general incorporation statutes
is illustrated by the fact that seemingly core aspects of government can be delegated to private cor-
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ample, the Supreme Court has argued that corporations are creations of
the state designed to confer special benefits on shareholders:
State law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation
and distribution of assets-that enhance their ability to attract capital
and to deploy their resources in133ways that maximizing the return on
their shareholders' investments.
For liberal theory, the freedom of individuals is taken as a prima fa134
cie good, while the freedom of the state is viewed with great suspicion.
This suspicion is such that a libertarian theorist like Robert Nozick can
claim, "The fundamental question of political philosophy, one that precedes questions about how the state should be organized, is whether there
should be any state at all."'135 One can think of social contract theories
and other liberal justifications for the state as secular theodicies in which
the primal evil of social coercion must be justified. 136 Such coercion is
the antithesis of individual autonomy and something requiring special
explanation. 37 As I have already noted, autonomy theories of contract
rest implicitly or explicitly on some version of the liberal distinction between the right and the good. Individuals have rights, including the right
to contract, so that they can pursue their own visions of the good. 138 In
contrast, the state is not supposed to pursue a particular vision of the
good. 139 Rather, respect for individuals requires that the state remain
neutral as to their particular ideals, confining itself to the protection of
their rights, or pursuit of a limited conception
of the good constrained by
0
the superior demands of individual rights.14

porations. See Owens v. Tri-County Turkey Creek Conservancy Dist. No. 21, 418 P.2d 674, 678
(Okla. 1966) (taxing power); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kueckelhan, 425 P.2d 669, 679 (Wash. 1967)
(law enforcement); Valero Eastex Pipeline Co. v. Jarvis, 926 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App. 1996)
(eminent domain).
133.
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990).
134.

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA ix (1974).

135. Id at4.
136.
Cf JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST Bk. I. 11. 23-26 (1667), available at
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu-rbear/lost/pll .html ("what is low raise and support; [t]hat to the highth
of this great [a]rgument I may assert Eternal Providence, and justifie the wayes of God to men").
137.
For a modem, and in some ways extreme, approach to the problem of justifying the "evil"
of collective coercion see NOZICK, supra note 134, at chs. 5-6 (presenting arguments in favor of a
state monopoly on most forms of protective violence).
138. See Joyce E. Taber, An Unanswered Question About Mandatory Arbitration: Should a
Mandatory Arbitration Clause Preclude The EEOC From Seeking Monetary Relief On An Employee 's Behalfln a Title VII Case?, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 281, 291 n.58 (2000).
139. Michael Mello, Adhering To Our Views: JusticesBrennan and MarshallAnd The Dissent
Towards Death As a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 592, 683 n.624 (1995).
140.
It should be noted that while the language of "rights" has a minimalist and libertarian
flavor to it some left-of-center theorists find off-putting. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 13, at 706
(referring to liberal theory's obsession with "dreaded 'crossings' of our 'boundaries"'). There are
liberal theories that justify a fairly expansive vision of wealth redistribution and the provision of
social services by the government. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 38, at 266 (arguing that social
inequalities should be arranged so as to benefit those who are least well off).
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We can now see why the concession theory of the corporation meets
the conceptual needs of the Artificial Personality Argument. If a corporation is an institution that exercises power delegated to it by the state,
then it does not make sense to justify the law governing its contracts with
the same theories that justify the contracts of individuals. On this view,
the actual human beings who sign the corporation's contracts and carry
out its affairs are analogous to government bureaucrats. They are human
beings, but their official actions are of a fundamentally different naturefrom the point of view of liberal political theory-from those engaged in
by private individuals. "Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted
or withheld is always a matter of state policy[,]' 141 Justice Brandeis
wrote. "If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to achieve an end
which the state deems desirable."' 142 Under the concession theory it is
this link between corporations and the desires of the state that makes
autonomy theories inapplicable to firm-to-firm contracts.
IV. THE FICTION THEORY, THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS, AND
AUTONOMY

One of the striking things about the theories sketched in the preceding section is how foreign they seem to most of contemporary corporate
law scholarship. For example, one scholar contends, "It has been over a
half-a-century since corporate legal theory, of any political or economic
stripe, took the concession theory seriously.', 143 While this is a bit of an
exaggeration,144 it is safe to say that neither the real nor the concession
theory represents a dominant approach in law and economics scholarship. Rather the dominant approach has been a modem version of the
ancient fiction theory of the corporation.145 Building on an individualistic framework for understanding legal entities that goes back at least to
the eleventh century, if not earlier, modem economists have conceptualized the corporation as a "nexus of contracts."' 146 As I shall argue, this
concept of the firm cannot be used by the Artificial Personality Argument and is actually quite consistent with autonomy theories of contract.
A. The Fiction Theory of Corporations
The fiction theory of the corporation is one the oldest approaches to
corporate jurisprudence. It asserts that corporations are nothing more
141.
142.

Liggett, 288 U.S. at 545 (Brandeis, J, dissenting).
Id.

143.
144.

STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 141 (2002).
See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER

BUSINESS

ORGANIZATIONS 151 (8th ed. 2000) ("[C]orporate law is constitutional law; that is, its dominant
function is to regulate the manner in which the corporate institution is constituted, to define the
relative rights and duties of those participating in the institution, and to delimit the powers of the
institution vis-a-vis the external world.").
145.
See BAINBRIDGE, supranote 143, at 199 ("The dominant model of the corporation in legal
scholarship is the so-called nexus of contracts theory.").
146.
See Michael J. Phillips, supra note 84, at 1071-72.
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than useful conceptual devices for understanding the relationships between individuals. 147 Under Roman law, the dominant form of business
organization, the societas, was conceptualized as a contract and lacked
most of the incidents of "corporateness."'' 48 During the eleventh century,
the jurisprudence of corporations took on a new urgency as the Catholic
Church came to be conceptualized legally as a set of interlocking corporations149 The medieval canonists, in turn, drew on the nominalist strand
of scholastic thought to define the corporation.
As one fourteenth-century jurist succinctly summarized the prevailing orthodoxy,
"All philosophers and canonists [believe] that the whole does not differ
really... from its parts."' 50 The medieval formulation of corporations as
"artificial persons" was to exert a powerful influence on corporate the5
ory, and centuries later the Supreme Court would use the same label.' 1
The medieval period also saw the rise of contractually created business organizations that served many of the same functions as modem
business corporations. One of the primary functions of legal personality
and limited liability is what economists call "asset partitioning." For
example:
Consider a business (ignoring the organizational form) with a few
owners. The owners will have personal creditors and the business
will have business creditors. Each class of creditors needs to know
which assets are available to satisfy which debts. Can the personal
creditors seize business assets such as machines and inventory if the
owner's personal debts are unpaid? Can the business creditors seize
an owner's house or car if the business's debts are unpaid? It is critically important to a well-functioning system of organizational law
that the answers to these two questions be clear, and extremely useful
that the law offer multiple1 52organizational forms that provide a varied
menu of answers to them.
Medieval lawyers solved these problems through a variety of contractual
mechanisms. Merchants could band together for a voyage, and purchase
a ship using a so-called "bottomary loan" (essentially a maritime mortgage). The ship would then become solely liable for the venture's liabilities.1 53 Italian traders created a contractual entity for business purposes-known as a commenda-that partitioned assets along similar

147. See id.
at 1064-65.
148.
NICHOLAS, supra note 33, at 185 ("Since Roman law had no concept of a corporation,
every joint commercial venture necessarily took the form of a societas ....
").
149.
See BERMAN, supra note 34, at 215-20 (discussing the constitutional role of corporate law
in the Papal Revolution of the eleventh century).
150.
Id.at 607-08 n.48 (quoting the jurist Bartolus).
151.
See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodworth, 17 U.S. 518, 605 (1819) (referring to
corporations as "artificial persons").
152.
Mahoney, supra note 125, at 876.
153.
See id. at 882-83 (discussing bottomary loans).
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lines. 154 During the Elizabethan period there were numerous joint stock
companies that lacked any formal charter. These companies were entirely contractual and allowed investors to limit their liability to the initial investment and reap some pro rata share of the returns of the venture. 155 In the wake of the South Sea Bubble, parliament passed laws
against unchartered joint stock companies, but such companies continued
to operate despite the law until the middle of the nineteenth century. 56
Thus, even as the concession theory of the corporation was rising to the
position of legal orthodoxy in the mid-nineteenth century, there was a
commercial reality in which most of the indicia of corporateness were
being created almost entirely by contract.157 Less than a century later,
this earlier contractual account
of the business corporation would be re158
discovered by economists.
B. The Nexus of Contracts Theory
The modem nexus of contract theory of the corporation traces its
origin to a 1937 article by Ronald Coase. 159 Coase was interested in understanding how the existence of the firm could be reconciled with what
he called "the main achievement of economic science," 160 namely the
insight that when resources are allocated using the decentralized process
of the market what results is not chaos but an orderly movement of goods
and services according to the price mechanism. If decentralized market
processes could effectively organize resources, why do "we find 'islands
of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps
of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk?"",16' Coase's answer to this
question was transaction costs. 62 Finding goods and services and negotiating terms to spot contracts for every single business transaction is
expensive. These costs can be avoided through a single contract that
gives a central authority the right of direction. "The contract," according
to Coase, "is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which
may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entre' 63
preneur within certain limits."'

154. Id. at 880-81. See also MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116, at 7-8 (discussing the Italian commenda).
155.
Mahoney, supranote 125, at 883-84.
156. Id. at 887-89. See also MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116, at 40 (discussing the Bubble Act of 1720).
157.
Mahoney, supra note 125, at 886-92 (The Triumph of the Concession Theory).
158. See generally Bratton, supra note 112, 1513-17 (arguing that the nexus of contract theory
restates the older fiction theory of the corporation).
159.
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937) available at
http://people.bu.edu/vaguirre/courses/bu332/naturefimn.pdf.
160.
See id.at 394.
161.
Id. at 387 (quoting D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (reprtd. & rev.
1948)).
162.
Id.at 390.
163.
Id.
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Later economists refined this model of the firm by pushing for an
even more individualistic, contractual approach. In 1972, Alchian and
Demsetz famously argued that Coase was mistaken to see managers as
exercising even circumscribed control, since employees' willingness to
64
follow direction was in every instance a matter of contractual choice.'
Four years later, Jensen and Meckling summarized what was to become
the conventional wisdom, writing that "[t]he private corporation or firm
is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus of contracting
relationships."' 165 More recently, even the nexus of contracts approach
has come under attack as insufficiently contractual. 66 The hyper-contractual approach in effect completes the deconstruction of "control" and "ownership" that Coase began. In this theory, all the participants are "investors" contributing intellectual and reputational capital
(employees) or cash and other resources (equity and debt).1 67 Each set of
participants then "controls" the other participants through monitoring and
sanctions. For example:
Employers often ...evaluate and reward or penalize the employee's
behavior ....Less obviously, employees often exercise similar control. They grant the employer the power to set certain conditions of
employment, to evaluate their performance, and to decide on bonuses
and promotions, but then they evaluate the employer's performance
and penalize or reward the employer (for
example, by quitting or ex168
erting less or more effort in the future).
In effect, these theorists simply dispense with the "nexus" in nexus of
contracts
theory, leaving only a web of interlocking connected con69
tracts.
For our purposes, particular solutions to the economic mystery of
the firm's existence are less important than the paradigm that these theories create for understanding the nature of corporations. Coase and his
progeny provide a way of conceptualizing the corporation as "a complex
set of explicit and implicit contracts.' 170 There are two aspects of this
approach that make it more hospitable to autonomy theories of contract
than either the real or concession theories. First, the contractual approach to the firm is essentially individualistic. Unlike the real theory, it
164.
See Alchian & Demsetz, Production,Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972).
165.
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and OwnershipStructures, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).

166.

See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REv. 887 (2000).

167.
See id.at 922-29.
168.
See id.at 921.
169.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Boardof Directorsas a Nexus of Contracts,88 IOWA L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (2002) ("Although their [Gulati, Klien, and Zolt] new model remains contractarian in
nature, it lacks a critical feature of the standard contractarian account - namely, a nexus.").
170.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The CorporateContract, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1416, 1418 (1989).
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does not rely on any communitarian notion of collective determination or
reified idea of the corporation independent of human constituents. 7 '
Indeed, it denies that a corporation is fundamentally different from any
other contractual endeavor. 172 Second, the contractual vision of the firm
conceptualizes it as arising out of private rather than government
choices. To be sure, nexus of contracts theorists acknowledge the existence of state promulgated corporate law, but they see these rules as providing contractual defaults in order to reduce transaction costs, rather
than as concessions of government power designed to serve the purposes
of the state. 173 Provisions of state corporate law that cannot be bargained
around are analyzed as mandatory
contractual provisions analogous to
174
mandatory rules in contract law.
The nexus of contracts theory's insistence on the fictitious nature of
the corporation also explains how liberal autonomy theorists could analyze firm-to-firm contracts. A contract between two firms appears to be
a contract between two separate, non-human entities, but in reality inter-firm contracts incompletely describe the underlying agreements of
actual human beings. The full terms of the agreement must be specified
using not only the explicit terms of the contract and the regular rules of
contract law, but also by the contracts-including the "contract" represented by corporate charters and management structures-which make
up the corporations that signed the agreement. Ultimately contracts between corporations are agreements between actual human beings. The
scope of the power of these human beings to "bind" other participants in
the corporate enterprise will be limited by the background rules of corporate law. However, the nexus-of-contracts theory teaches us that ultimately these rules can be thought of in largely consensual terms. Corporate agents exercising their discretion become essentially analogous to
any other individual whose discretion and ability to bind others is limited
by pre-existing contracts. The presence of the corporation form works
no decisive shift in moral status. Thus, from the point of view of the
nexus of contract theory, the Artificial Personality Argument is untenable. It mistakes a useful shorthand- the corporation-for a decisive
difference where no such decisive difference exists. 175
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 1418-20.
Id.
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., CorporateFiduciaryPrincipalsFor The Post-Contractarian

Era,23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 565 (1996).

174. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981) (setting forth general
requirements of contractual capacity); Id. § 14 (limitations on the enforceability of contracts by
infants); Id. § 15 (limitations on the enforceability of contracts by those with mental illnesses or
defects); Id. § 110 (listing of contracts covered by the Statute of Frauds); Id. § 178 (unenforceability
of agreements on public policy grounds); Id. § 189 (contracts in restraint of marriage); Id. § 356
(prohibition on penalty clauses).
175.
One arguably decisive difference is the limited liability provided by the corporate form.
However, there is no reason that limited contractual liability cannot be created entirely by agreement. Indeed limiting the pool of assets available to answer for a particular contract is routinely
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The nexus of contracts theory, thus, turns the table on efficiency
theorists who would invoke the Artificial Personality Argument. Just as
the Artificial Personality Argument claims one has nothing to say when
viewing firm-to-firm contracts through the lens of autonomy theories,
when one views the Artificial Personality Argument through the lens of
economics one finds that the conception of the corporation that the argument requires is not the one endorsed by contemporary law and economics scholarship.
One might object that the nexus of contracts response to the Artificial Personality Argument rests on an equivocation. The term "contract"
in the nexus of contract theory 76 does not mean the same thing that
"contract" means in contract law and therefore the argument is fallacious. 177 This criticism can be met in the following way. Economics and
law clearly do not use the term "contract" in precisely the same way.
When economists speak of contracts they are generally using the term
broadly to include all voluntary transactions. 178 It can encompass everything from simultaneous exchanges and informal deals to highly formalized long-term written agreements. The important point is that the transactions are consensual rather than required by government regulations or
some other external source of coercion. 79 In contrast, lawyers use the
term contract in a much more limited way. Thus, the Restatement (Second) Contracts defines a contract as "a promise or set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the
law in some way recognizes as a duty."' 80 Generally, a contract requires
the formalities of offer, acceptance, and consideration.'
The juristic
done through devices such as non-recourse secured lending. Likewise, the liability shield provided
by the corporate form is routinely waived - at least for some businesses - through personal guarantees offered for corporate debts. Tort liability, of course, presents a different case, but there is no
obvious reason why autonomy theories of contractual liability should be dramatically influenced by
the scope of tort liability.
176.
Braucher, supra note 13, at 698-99.
177.
Cf Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLuM. L.
REv. 1757, 1764 n.30 (1980) ("Economists tend to view contracts as relationships characterized by
reciprocal expectations and behavior ....).
178.
Id. ("Economists tend to view contracts as relationships characterized by reciprocal expectations and behavior.").
179.
Melvin Eisenberg summed up this point, writing:
In ordinary language, the term contract means an agreement. In law, the term means a
legally enforceable promise. Pretty clearly, however, the nexus-of-contracts conception
does not mean either that the corporation is a nexus of agreements or that it is a nexus of
legally enforceable promises. Instead, the conception means that the corporation is a
nexus of reciprocal arrangements.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual
Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822 (1999).
180.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
See generally 1 E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §1.1 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the legal definition of "contract").
181.
See, e.g., Davis v. Dykman, 938 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Alaska 1997) ("The formation of a
valid contract requires an offer encompassing all essential terms, unequivocal acceptance by the
offeree, consideration, and an intent to be bound."). The law of contract, of course, abounds with
exceptions to these requirements and will enforce many agreements and promises that do not meet
them. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 82(1) (1981) (promise to pay a debt
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and economic definitions of contract thus look quite different, and the
charge of equivocation seems correct. The problem with this line of reasoning is that the Artificial Personality Argument itself is an attack on
juristic categories. Insofar as the law is concerned, there is no difference
between the contracts entered into by a corporation and those entered
into by a natural person. 182 This is precisely the position that the Artificial Personality Argument rejects. Rather it insists that one must import
non-juristic distinctions between persons and corporations-namely the
distinction that says they are entitled to different sorts of moral respectinto contract theory in order to understand the discontinuous nature of
contract.
Contracts between human beings and contracts between firms require differing theoretical approaches not because of any juristic distinction but because-all juristic categories aside-firms simply are not real
people. The argument thus stands or falls based on the non-juristic distinctions that it is making. If, however, the nexus of contracts approach
is accepted, then the activity of a firm can be understood in voluntaristic
and individualistic terms. This is precisely what the Artificial Personality Argument denies. In the end, the equivocation response rests on a
category mistake. It wrongly assumes that the Artificial Personality Argument is directed against a full-fledged set of juristic categories rather
than against the more primitive concepts of person, choice, and autonomy employed by philosophical defenders of contract.
C.

The Failureof the Artificial PersonalityArgument

The ultimate validity of the Artificial Personality Argument rests on
which of the three competing theories of the corporation is "true." Cast
in these terms, evaluating the argument is a daunting task. From at least
the eleventh century to the present, debates have raged about the "true
nature" of corporations, and it seems unlikely that a definitive answer to
the question is going to emerge. However, it is important to remember
that the Artificial Personality Argument need not be thought of as a
free-standing claim about the nature of contracts and corporations.
Rather it is part of a larger attempt to understand the relationship between autonomy and efficiency theories of contract. Seen in this context,
the Artificial Personality Argument fails. Recall that the Artificial Perunrecoverable because of statute of limitations); Id. § 83 (promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy); Id. § 84(1) (a promise to perform a duty conditioned on an event that did not occur); Id. § 85
(promise to perform a voidable duty), Id. § 86 (promise for past or moral consideration); Id. § 87 (a
written option contract reciting consideration); Id. § 88 (a written guaranty reciting consideration);
Id. § 89 (fair and equitable modification of an existing contract); Id. § 90 (promissory estoppel)
(1982); U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003) (firm offer rule).
182. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(26) (2003) ("'Party', as distinct from third-party, means a
person who has engaged in a transaction or made an agreement within the code."); Id. § 1-201(b)(27)
("'Person' includes an individual or organization"); Id. § 2-204(1) ("A contract for the sale of good
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract.").
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sonality Argument was offered as a horizontal independence strategy as
an attempt to reconcile autonomy and efficiency theories of contract by
showing that they apply to different sorts of things. Hence, the Artificial
Personality Argument can only demonstrate the horizontal independence
of these theories if it is consistent with the economic approach that it
seeks to defend. It is not. In assessing the Artificial Personality Argument we can thus move from daunting and loaded questions about the
"true" nature of things to more tractable questions about the consistency
of different pieces of a larger argument.
Modem economics of the sort invoked by efficiency theories of
contract is firmly committed to methodological individualism. 183 What
this means is that the individual is taken as the basic unit of social explanation. 184 This methodological individualism, coupled with an assumption of rationality and scarcity is what marks economics off from other
social sciences such as sociology or anthropology. The insistence on
rational individualism is more than a simple matter of policing disciplinary boundaries, however. It provides the basis for two important ambitions of modem economics. The first ambition is that social scientific
theories be falsifiable.
Most economists in theory aspire to the Popperian model of science in which theories generate predications that can
then be falsified through observation. 185 The gradual accretion of theories that withstand repeated attempts at falsification, as well as the rejection of theories that fail this test, is supposed to lead to increased scientific knowledge of human activity. The insistence on individual rationality allows economists to produce theories from which predictions can be
rigorously and logically deduced. This deductive character makes the
theories potentially falsifiable and hence, on Popper's view, scientific.
The second ambition is theoretical unity. The rational actor model holds
out the promise that a single mode of explanation can account for all
interesting or important social phenomena. 186 Whatever the merits of
183.
See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 59 (3d ed. 1995)
(describing the basic assumptions of the rational actor model).
184.
Some economists, particularly those who place their hopes in sociobiology or neuroscience reject the individualistic reductionism of mainstream economics, arguing that the basic units of
social explanation are sub-individual, e.g., neuropathways, etc. See, e.g., Terrence R. Chorvat et al.,
Law & Neuroeconomics, (George Mason Law & Econ., Working Paper Series, Paper No. 04-07,
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=501063.
185.
See Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophy of Economics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY
§
4.1
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.,
Winter
ed.
2003),
available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/economics/ ("Karl Popper's philosophy of science has been influential among economists."). Compare MAX BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS: OR How
ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN (1992) with TERRENCE HUTCHISON, ON THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS

AND THE FORMALIST REVOLUTION (2000) (prominent defenses of a Popperian approach to economics); KARL POPPER, The Logic of the Social Sciences, in THE POSITIVIST DISPUTE IN GERMAN
SOCIOLOGY 87 (Teodor W. Adomo et al., eds. Glyn Adey & David Frisby trans., Harper & Row
Publishers 1976) (setting forth his own theory of social science).
186.
See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE 15-16 (1932) (defining economics as the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses). Robbins was an early and
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these ambitions, they demonstrate that methodological individualism is
not some secondary part of modem economics but rather is central to the
entire intellectual enterprise.
The rational actor of economics and the autonomous individual of
liberalism are slightly different people. One can be an economist without
being a liberal, and one can be a liberal without subscribing to the shibboleths of microeconomic theory. Both positions, however, share a hostility to the collectivism of the real theory of corporations. For example,
the gravamen of liberal social contract theory is that the individual is
prior to the community, which must be justified in individualistic terms.
Likewise, economists have insisted that collective action must be understood by reference to individual choices and incentives.18 7 Neither theory is hospitable to Gierke's claims about collective wills and Gnossenshaft. The concession theory is less overtly inconsistent with economic
theory, but from an economic point of view it is ultimately question begging. Even if one accepted it as a historical account of the rise of the
corporation's legal personality, Coase and his progeny point out that one
is still left with the question of why economic activity is carried out by
firms at all. Answering that question in the individualistic terms of modem economics leads inevitably toward the nexus of contract theory. In
short, efficiency theorists cannot invoke the Artificial Personality Argument to side step the competing claims of autonomy theorists without
simultaneously endorsing (if only implicitly) theories of the corporation
that are at odds with the basic assumptions of economics.
V. APPLYING AUTONOMY THEORIES TO THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS:
THE EXAMPLE OF INTERPRETATION

The arguments presented above show that one cannot dismiss
autonomy theories from firm-to-firm contracts on the basis of an a priori
claim about the nature of the corporation. The fiction theory-and in
particular the nexus-of-contracts theory-demonstrates that one needn't
assume that firm-to-firm contracts somehow belong to a different metaphysical class from contracts between individuals that renders them
unamenable to autonomy theories. However, the a priori failure of the
Artificial Personality Argument does not necessarily mean that autonomy
theories have anything to offer to our understanding of firm-to-firm contracts. Unless autonomy theories suggest results that differ from those
generated by the economic theories offered in their place, the failure of
influence advocate for an expansive view of economics. A more recent writer taking a similar
position is Richard Posner, who claims:
[E]conomics is the science of rational choice in a world - our world - in which resources
are limited in relation to human wants. The task of economics, so defined, is to explore
the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions - what we shall call his 'self-interest.'
POSNER, supranote 15, at 3-4.
187. See, e.g., MACUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
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the Artificial Personality Argument remains an essentially scholastic
point. The issue of contract interpretation offers an example of how
autonomy and efficiency theories sharply diverge when applied to firmto-firm contracts.
A. Hyper-Formalismand the Efficiency Norm
One must first understand the striking results that a consistent application of the efficiency norm to contractual interpretation yields. According to the ingenious argument put forward by Schwartz and Scott, if
one's only goal is to maximize the joint gains from contracting, then one
ought to adopt a very hard version of the plain meaning rule.1 88 Rather
than looking to all of the circumstances surrounding a transaction and
evidence of the intention of the parties, one should interpret the words of
the contract as literally as possible. Going hand in hand with this position is an equally hard-edged version of the parol evidence rule. 8 In
short, contractual interpretation should be simplified to a literal reading
of the language within the four comers of a written contract and nothing
more. This hyper-formalist approach rests on three inter-related concepts: cost, risk, and diversification.
All things being equal, the efficiency norm suggests that low-cost
dispute resolution is to be preferred to high-cost dispute resolution. Hyper-formalism has the obvious advantage of cheap dispute resolution.
One can dispense with expensive and time-consuming fact-finding, with
the attendant army of disputes and arguments over the reliability and
interpretation of evidence. One simply reads the contract without reference to any divergence between that reading and the actual intent of the
parties.
The obvious objection to such an approach is that sometimes it will
produce "wrong" interpretations that vary significantly from anything
envisioned by the parties. One of the insights provided by Schwartz and
Scott is that stopping the analysis at this point is a mistake.' 90 The next
question should be whether the "mistakes" produced by hyper-formalism
are systematic. Do they consistently favor one group in a way that can
be predicted in advance? Schwartz and Scott conclude that they do
not.' 9 ' Accordingly, they argue that we should not care about the "mis-

188.
Schwartz & Scott, supranote 10, at 569 ("Typical firms prefer courts to make interpretations on a narrow evidentiary base whose most significant component is the written contract.").
189. "Under [the parol evidence rule] when the parties to a contract embody their agreement in
writing and intend the writing to be the final expression of their agreement, the terms of the writing
may not be varied or contradicted by evidence of any prior written or oral agreement.... ." BLACK'S
LAW DICT"ONARY 1117 (6th ed. 1990).

190.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 575-76.
191.
Id. at 575-76. Schwartz and Scott are careful not to overstate their case, acknowledging
that under some circumstances profit maximizing firms would not be indifferent to contract "misinterpretation." Id. at 576-77.
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takes" in the context of corporate contracts.1 92 A corporation is going to
have lots of contracts. Hence, it can expect to "win" about as often as it
"loses" under a regime of hyper-formalist contract interpretation. 1 A
93
firm's contracts thus become analogous to a diversified stock portfolio.
The investor in such a stock portfolio should be risk-neutral as to any
particular stock, since diversification allows one to balance declining
stocks with advancing stocks. The only thing that matters is the aggregate performance of the portfolio. Similarly, if our sole goal is to maximize the value of a firm, we should be indifferent to the "performance"
of any particular contract under a hyper-formalist interpretation regime.
So long as "winning" interpretations are as frequent as "losing" interpretations, the risk of judicial "mistakes" is diversified away and the firm
realizes the full benefits of the cheaper resolution of contractual disputes.
The analogy to a stock portfolio also illustrates the stockholder centric nature of the efficiency argument for hyper-formalism. It ultimately
privileges the position of a diversified investor whose only goal is to
maximize the return on her investment. Such an investor would clearly
prefer the hyper-formalist interpretation regime. On the other hand,
managers and employees, for whom the corporation is not simply an
income stream, but also, a place where they spend much of their time and
lavish much of their energy, 194 quite possibility might prefer that their
plans and arrangements be carried out according to their intentions,
rather than falling victim to random-albeit evenly distributedmisinterpretation by the courts. The question thus becomes why we
should adopt the perspective of such an investor. Schwartz and Scott
offer essentially two reasons for taking this position. The first is that
stockholders "own" the corporation and'are entitled by that "ownership"
to have the firm's contracts interpreted to maximize the value of their
investment. 195 The second is that employees of a corporation are required by law to maximize shareholder value. 1 96 Upon closer examination, however, the argument from ownership turns out to be circular and
the argument from the legal requirements of employees rests on an oversimplification of corporate law.
As a legal matter, it is not true that shareholders "own" a corporation, and once the claim is unpacked it seems to be little more than a restatement of a conclusion. Legally speaking, shareholders are the residual claimants on the assets of a corporation and have the ability to exer192. See id.
at 550-54.
193.
This analogy is mine rather than Schwartz and Scott's.
194. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116 (noting that people live much of their
lives and work out much of their identity within the context of corporations).
195. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 550-51 ("A firm is direct by its owners, who often are
shareholders. Shareholders prefer their firms to maximize profits ....
").
196.
Id. at 551 ("[T]he legal rules that attempt to deter bad manager behavior fall into the
domains of the criminal, corporate, and securities laws. Contract law should exploit this specialization by assuming that the agreements it regulates reflect the parties' maximizing choices.").
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cise some power through their voting over its management. Shareholders, however, lack many of the other crucial indicia of property owners.
For example, they do not have day-to-day control over a corporation or
its assets. 197 They do not have the right to exclude others from a corporation's property. By virtue of owning stock in the General Electric Company ("GE"), I do not have the power to throw someone out of a GE factory. Indeed, not only do stockholders lack the ability to exclude others
from corporate property, they themselves can be excluded from it. Were
I to trespass on GE's property, my ownership of GE stock would not
constitute a valid defense to a tort action against me. 198 One might still
assert that shareholders are the owners of the company in some important
normative sense. Whatever this sense, it is not one that we usually associate with property. No one, to my knowledge, argues that shareholders
should be given all the incidents of control that would flow from treating
a corporation as their property. No one, for example, argues that GE
stockholders should be exempt from the law of trespass as it applies to
GE property. In short, the claim that stockholders own the corporation
amounts neither to the claim that they exercise full legal property rights
in a corporation nor to the claim that they should exercise such legal
rights in the corporation. Ultimately, it amounts to the claim that corporations ought to be run for the benefit of shareholders. Yet this is precisely the conclusion that that concept of ownership was invoked to support. Hence, introducing the concept of property into the discussion of
the shareholder's status neither accurately states the law nor materially
advances the normative discussion. In this context, it amounts to little
more than a restatement of the conclusion being argued for.' 99
It is far from clear that employees of a corporation are required by
law to run a corporation so as to maximize shareholder value. For starters, dozens of states have passed laws explicitly allowing corporate managers to consider the interests of corporate constituencies other than
shareholders, e.g., employees or members of the community in which a

197.
Amdur v. Meyer, 224 N.Y.S.2d 440, 433 (App. Div. 1962) (holding that shareholders
cannot require management to follow particular business policies); Associated Grocers of Ala., Inc.
v. Willingham, 77 F. Supp. 990, 966 (N.D. Ala. 1948) (same), Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99
N.E. 138, 141 (N.Y. 1912) (same), Automatic Self-Cleaning Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cunninghame,
(1906) 2 Ch. 34 (U.K.) (same).

198.
My status as a stockholder, however, would guarantee me access to corporate property for
the purposes of inspecting the books. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220 (2005). See also Susan B.
Hoffhagle & Jolyan A. Butler, Shareholders' Right to Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 4

CONN. L. REv. 707 (1972) (discussing the scope of shareholder's inspection rights).
199.
William W. Bratton summarizes this point thus:
"Ownership" becomes as irrelevant a concept as "firm entity" [under the nexus of contracts theory]. The "firm" is only a series of contracts covering inputs being joined so as
to become output. "Capital," and thus the traditional legal situs of ownership, devolves
into one of the many types of inputs.
Bratton, supra note 112, at 1499. Cf Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 164, at 781-83, 789 n.14
(owners contract for rights to anticipated residual rewards).
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corporation is located. 200 The practical effect of these statutes has been
fairly minimal.20 ' However, their limited significance does not come
from a powerful, countervailing legal requirement that employees manage a corporation in the interests of the shareholders. Rather, it comes
from the fact that corporate managers are granted broad discretion in
how they manage corporations.
The courts have frequently declared that corporate managers are fiduciaries of the corporation.20 2 In practice, however, this fiduciary status
places few limits on managerial decision-making. It does create substantial legal requirements with regard to the theft of corporate assets or opportunities, 20 3 but the business judgment rule provides a virtually impenetrable shield from legal oversight of ordinary business decisions.2
So long as a manager complies with the proper formalities and exercises
some basic modicum of care she is immune from legal attack and the
courts will not second guess her decisions. 20 5 Furthermore, although the
corporation may sue a manager for breach of fiduciary duty and a shareholder may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation, a shareholder himself generally cannot sue misbehaving corporate managers for
most kinds of misbehavior.2 6
200. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e),
repealed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756 (2004); FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2005); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-202(b)(5) (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 30-1602, -1702 (2005); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85
(2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d), (f), (g) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West
2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12- 210(4) (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G)(2)
(2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B § 65 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2004);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 212035(c) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-A:6-1(2), 6-14(4) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-1135(D) (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Consol. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.59(E) (LexisNexis 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2005); PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 515- 16
(2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2005); WIS. STAT. §
180.0827 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e) (2005) (enacted 1989).
201.
See Robert Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156
(1993); Lawrence Mitchell, A Theoretical Frameworkfor Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992).
202. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), Pueblo Bancorp v. Lindoe,
Inc., 37 P.3d 492, 499 (Colo. App. 2001), In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 878 A.2d
975,999-1000 (2005).
203. See, e.g., Klinicki v. Lundgren, 695 P.2d 906 (Or. 1985), Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71
(Minn. 1974), Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940), Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). See
also Victor Brudney & Robert Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV.
997 (1981).
204.
The business judgment rule "immunizes management from liability in corporate transaction[s] undertaken within both power of corporation and authority of management where there is
reasonable basis to indicate that transaction was made with due care and in good faith." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 200 (6th ed. 1990).
205. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d 805 (holding that Delaware law presumes that managers act
in good faith and in the best interests of the firm). Under Delaware law, even an explicit showing of
bad-faith or incompetence is not sufficient for legal interference with the business decisions so long
as a defendant can prove the "entire fairness" of the transaction. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
206.
As the Delaware Chancery Court has explained:
A bill filed by stockholders in their derivative right . . . has two phases - one is the
equivalent of a suit to compel the corporation to sue, and the other is the suit by the cor-
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To be sure, one can find precatory language in judicial opinions to
the effect that corporations should be run in the interest of the shareholders, but the business judgment rule insures that such language has little if
any real impact on managerial decision making. In any case, there is
reason to believe that such language was never meant to enshrine the
shareholder primacy norm. The locus classicus for the shareholder primacy norm is Dodge v. FordMotor Co.,207 where the Michigan Supreme
Court stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits
among stockholders in order to devote them to
2 8
0
purposes.
other
When this dicta is viewed in context, however, it is clear that what is
involved is not a generalized duty by managers to maximize shareholder
value, but rather, a prohibition on the oppression of minority shareholders in the case of a closely held corporation. The case arose out a dispute
between Henry Ford and the Dodge brothers, who owned ten percent of
the stock in Ford Motor Company. 20 9 The Dodge brothers opposed
Henry Ford's management style and wished to set up their own car company to compete with Ford. 210 Henry Ford wanted to forestall this by
denying capital to the Dodge brothers and forcing them out of the company.21 ' Accordingly, Henry Ford had the board of directors cease the
payment of stock dividends and then he himself resigned, went to California, and announced that he would be setting up a new car company to
compete with Ford.21 2 All of these antics were ploys to depress the value
2 13
of the Dodge brother's Ford Motor Company stock and force them out.
Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled for the Dodge brothers
not because of some generalized duty to maximize share value, but
rather, because of the right of dissenting minority shareholders to be free

poration, asserted by the stockholders on its behalf, against those liable to it. The former
belongs to the complaining shareholders; the latter to the corporation. The complaining
stockholders are allowed in derivative bills to bring forward those two causes of action in
one suit.
Cantor v. Sachs, 162 A. 73, 76 (Del. Ch. 1939). Accord Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232 (I11.
1988) ("The derivative action really consists of two causes of action; one against the directors for
failing to sue; and the second based upon the right belonging to the corporation.").
207.
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
208. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
209. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder PrimacyNorm, 23 J. CoRP. L. 277, 316 (1997).
210. See id.
211.
Seeid. at317-18.
212. See id.
213. See id.
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from unreasonable oppression. 214 The court pointedly did not issue an
injunction against plant expansions that the Dodge brothers
believed
2 15
would be unprofitable, citing the business judgment rule.
B. Autonomy Theories andInterpretation
By and large, autonomy theories prescribe a different method of interpreting contracts. If contract law is a matter of enforcing a particular
set of commitments that individuals make as a way of expanding their
liberty, then it follows that we must know what the individuals themselves committed to. Indeed, to the extent the "misinterpretation" of a
contract-that is an interpretation that varies from the intent of the parties-leads to legal coercion, we are faced with the primal question of
liberal political theory, namely the justification of collective violence.
Autonomy theories of contract purport to answer this question in the
limited case of self-imposed or consensual legal obligations.2t 6 Once
contractual liability goes beyond such self-imposed obligations, however, it can no longer be justified by autonomy theories. These considerations mean that autonomy theories of contract must take a broader
approach to contractual interpretation than the hyper-formalism suggested by a single-minded devotion to the efficiency norm. This does
not mean that autonomy theories are committed to a wholly subjective
theory of interpretation. As Charles Fried has written:
It is a truism in the philosophy of language that in interpreting a person's words we are not guessing at the hidden but determined content
of some list of meanings in the speaker's head. Rather
our concerns
2 17
particularize render concrete, inchoate meanings.
Such an approach, however, does require an attention to context and intention that would be foreclosed by a rule limiting inquiry into a contract's meaning to a literal interpretation of the plain meaning of a signed
document.
Just as the nature and law of corporations does not provide any reason for adopting the shareholder primacy norm implicit in the argument
of the new lex mercatoria, it also provides no reason for rejecting auton214.
See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 ("There should be no confusion... of the duties which Mr.
Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law
he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders.").
215.
Id. (confessing that "judges are not business experts."). Dodge can be profitably contrasted with the well-known Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (I11.App. Ct. 1968) in which a
disgruntled shareholder argued that the refusal of the Chicago Cubs' management to install night
stadium lighting decreased profits. The court held that the board was not obligated to make profits
their sole goal and could appropriately consider factors such as the impact of their decisions on the
community and on the game of baseball as a whole. Id. at 180-82. See also ARTHUR R. PINTO &
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 19 (1999) (distinguishing Dodge from

Shlensky on the grounds that Dodge involved oppression of minority shareholders).
216.
FRIED, supra note 55, at 16.
217.
Id. at 60.
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omy theories. Armed with an understanding of the corporation as a
nexus of contracts, one can apply the broader notion of interpretation
inherent in autonomy theories to contracts between corporations. The
easiest way of illustrating this is through a thought experiment. Imagine
an entrepreneur who has a new idea around which he builds his business.
In order to advance his goals he enters into various contracts with individuals and companies. His decision to make these contracts is an exercise of his liberty. To be sure, part of his motivation is profit. However,
this is by no means his sole motivation. People start businesses for many
reasons-such as the desire for independence or to be one's own bossthat are not easily reducible to simple profits.21 8 Furthermore, liberal
philosophy's indifference to ends means that, properly speaking, our
entrepreneur's motives are irrelevant. What matters is whether his actions violate the liberal principle. Provided that they do not, the law
should further his autonomous choices by enforcing his contracts. Or, so
say the autonomy theories.21 9
As our entrepreneur's business grows, his contracts will become
more complex. He will develop relationships with employees, suppliers,
and creditors that will be governed by long-term agreements. No doubt,
these contracts will present knotty issues of interpretation. Language
may be vague and many assumptions will be left implicit. Nevertheless,
autonomy theories have a reasonably clear set of implications. We ought
to be willing to expend judicial resources and require that parties incur
costlier litigation in order to see to it that each contract, insofar as it is
possible to do so, is enforced to accord with the original intent of the
parties. In many cases, the ultimate purpose of the parties to these contracts will be to maximize their wealth. According to autonomy theories,
however, this is not the primary concern of contract law. 220 The reason is
that the law of contract represents state action compelling one party to a
lawsuit against his or her will. As such, it must stand the test of the liberal principle, which requires that the state be indifferent to its citizens'
ends, focusing instead upon the protection and advancement of their liberty. Hence, autonomy theories require that we inquire into the actual
intent and meaning of our entrepreneur's contracts.
Thus far, there is nothing in the nature of our entrepreneur's contracts that would lead us to believe that they ought to be analyzed using
218.
This point is hardly confined to the case of entrepreneurs. Most people make professional
and career decisions on the basis of a complex set of factors, of which monetary profit is but a single
- and often not the most important - part. Consider, for example, the fact that such talented lawyers
as Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz could surely make more money working on Wall Street or K
Street than they currently do at Yale Law School and the University of Virginia.
219.
FRIED, supra note 55, at 7 ("But whatever we accomplish and however that accomplishment is judged, morality requires that we respect the person and property of others, leaving them free
to make their lives as we are left free to make ours. This is the liberal ideal.").
220. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW
206, 224 (Peter Benson ed. 2001).
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some new set of theories. Now suppose that he faces the problem of
asset partitioning. 22 1 He wants to specify that certain assets under his
control will be available to answer for the debts of his business but other
assets should not be available to answer such debts. As we have seen
there are a variety of ways in which he might accomplish this. For example, he could structure his debts as non-recourse loans secured by his
widget-making machine. As is common in such transactions, he might
enter into covenants that would limit his control over the widget-making
machine, agreeing, for example, that he will maintain it in good working
order and not sell it without first paying the debt.
Over time, the accretion of such contracts would do two things for
our entrepreneur. First, it would significantly limit his personal liability
for payment of "business" debts.222 Second, it would significantly limit
his former freedom to control "business" property without subjecting
himself to the risk of significant personal liability. 223 Neither of these
changes, however, represents any fundamental change in the nature of
the contracts of the entrepreneur from the point of view of autonomy
theories. The limitations on personal liability are simply terms in particular contracts, representing the choices of autonomous individuals
pursuing their chosen ends. Likewise, the entrepreneur's loss of control
over particular assets does not mean that his liberty is no longer the
structuring normative principle of contract enforcement. It simply means
respect for that liberty requires honoring his choice to give up certain
freedoms and that he be subjected to liability for the violation of certain
self-imposed duties and obligations to others. Under autonomy theories,
however, both of these propositions are true of any contract. 224
Now suppose that our entrepreneur decides to get around the assetpartitioning problem in a different way. Rather than doing so by using
secured lending and other explicitly contractual devices, he chooses to
incorporate his business. This action will do three things. First, it will
limit his personal liability. Those assets that he assigns to the new corporation will now be answerable exclusively for corporate debts, and in the
absence of some further contract, his personal assets will be immune
from attachment by corporate creditors. Second, it will limit his control
over business assets. How much this control is limited will depend on
essentially two things. The first is the corporate law of the state in which
he incorporates the business. 2 5 Second, the terms of the corporate char221.
See text accompanying notes 146 & 158.
222.
See Lynn LoPucki, The End of Liability, 106 YALE L. J. 1, 14-19 (1997) (arguing that
secured lending allows debtors effectively to avoid or limit most of their liability).
223.
For example, the non-recourse loan in the preceding paragraph might contain a covenant
not to sell the widget-making machine, the violation of which would subject our entrepreneur to full
personal liability for the loan.
224.
FRIED, supra note 55, at 14, 16-17.
225.
PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 215, at 2 ("Every state has a corporate law statute that
provides the rules for the corporations incorporated in that state .... ").
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ter and bylaws will place further limits on his power.2 26 The third thing
that incorporation will allow our entrepreneur to do is raise money by
offering stock to others. Offering stock may further limit his control
over the business by subjecting him to obligations in addition to those
contained in the state law and the corporate charter, most notably federal
securities regulations.
By now, our entrepreneur will be hedged in by a variety of legal obligations. He is no longer the solo operator more or less free from legal
constraints that he was when he first began his business. However, all of
these new obligations are the result of voluntary actions by him and those
to whom he becomes obligated. Furthermore, there is a well-developed
body of law that defines the scope and meaning of those obligations, and
as we have seen, there is nothing in that body of law suggesting that he
has consented to a fundamental shift in how his business contracts should
be interpreted. To be sure, the laws of corporate governance and agency
now impact the legal effect of his contracts on behalf of the corporation,
but none of these bodies of law suggests that some new kind of contract
law applies to the contracts he enters into as part of his business. Nor do
they require that profit be the goal of his contracts.
One might object that even if autonomy theories can be applied to
relatively small and autocratically run corporations where contracts represent the will of a single manager with merely bounded power, they
cannot be applied to the contracts of more complex corporations. The
"decisions" of these larger corporations cannot be thought of as those of
a single individual. As Jensen and Meckling put it:
[T]he "behavior" of the firm is like the behavior of a market; i.e., the
outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the
trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market as an individual, but
we often make this error by thinking about organizations
as if they
227
were persons with motivations and intentions.
One could argue that the idealized story of the entrepreneur presented
above obscures this fact. When we recognize that corporate behavior is
being dictated by complex market forces rather than individual decisions,
then autonomy theories ought to be jettisoned.
The problem with this objection is that ultimately it proves too
much. Every time a corporation makes a contract, it does so because
some actual individual has come to some decision as to how he or she
will exercise the discretion that belongs to her. Despite Dan-Cohen's
hypothetical, in our world it remains an irreducible fact that contracts by
corporations are always made by human beings. The legal scope of a
226. Id. at 11 ("The articles [of incorporation] may also contain other significant discretionary
provisions authorized by statute.").
227. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 165, at 311.
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corporate agent's discretion will be set by the law of corporations, which
as we have seen, does not commit her to an a priori duty to maximize
stockholder value. Nevertheless, as Jensen and Meckling rightly point
out, she will be subject to pressures created by the market-like forces
within the firm that will ultimately dictate many contractual terms.2 28
The question thus becomes whether the fact that the terms of the contract
are, in some sense, the outcome of a complex "market" renders the resulting contract fundamentally different than other contracts in the way
posited by the Artificial Personality Argument. Once the question is
seen in these terms, its answer becomes straightforward. Virtually every
contract will contain terms that are determined by complex market transactions. The most obvious example is the price term in a sales contract.229 If one neighbor sells a used lawnmower to another neighbor, the
market in lawnmowers will largely control the price term. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the seller cannot charge $10,000 for the
lawnmower because the buyer can easily purchase a new lawnmower at
Home Depot for considerably less money. A host of factors ranging
from the demand for lawnmowers in the local area to the price of steel on
international commodity markets, in turn, will determine the price at
Home Depot. If the mere fact that an implicit or explicit term in a contract resulted from complex market transactions was sufficient to dismiss
autonomy theories of contract, virtually every contract would be beyond
the reach of such theories. Such a claim would be controversial to say
the least and is clearly beyond the scope of the Artificial Personality Argument.
The idealized story of our entrepreneur illustrates an important
point, namely that we ought not to be seduced by the language of entity
that surrounds our discussion of corporations. To be sure, it is extremely
useful to talk and think about corporations as separate entities in many
contexts. However,
The "personhood" of a corporation is a matter of convenience rather
than reality .... There are many actors, from production employees
to managers to equity investors to debt investors to holders of warranty and tort claims against the firm. The arrangements among
these persons usually depend on contracts and on positive law, not on
corporate law or the status of the corporation as an entity. More of-

228.

Id.

229.

See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 19 (5th ed. 2001)

("What [the] price and quantity [of goods] will be depends on the particular characteristics of supply
and demand. Variations of price and quantity over time depend on the ways in which supply and
demand respond to other economic variables, such as aggregate economic activity and labor costs,
which are themselves changing.").
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ten than not a reference to230the corporation as an entity will hide the
essence of the transaction.
This is certainly true when corporate personality is invoked to explain
what corporate contracts are "really" about.
The actors involved in the idealized story of our entrepreneurcustomers, creditors, employees, stockholders and the entrepreneur himself-will all have different motives and goals in participating in the
business. From the point of view of the liberal philosophy embedded in
autonomy theories of contract, the point of the exercise is not to maximize the returns for a single group-stockholders---or even for all
groups, but rather, to facilitate the peaceful co-operation of individuals
pursuing disparate ends. Jules Coleman has written that the market can
be thought of as an essentially political institution that allows those with
widely differing conceptions of the good to nevertheless cooperate
peacefully with one another. 23 1 The nexus-of-contracts theory teaches us
that the corporation is simply the market in another guise.232 In this
sense, the nexus-of-contracts theory makes the corporation into a much
weaker concept than is assumed by the Artificial Personality Argument.
As two of the nexus-of-contracts theory's most prominent proponents
have argued:
An approach that emphasizes the contractual nature of the corporation removes from the field of interesting questions one that has
plagued many writers: What is the goal of the corporation? Is it
profit, and for whom? Social welfare more broadly defined? Is there
anything wrong with corporate charity? Should corporations try to
maximize profit over the long run or the short run? Our response to
such questions is: Who cares? If the New York Times is formed to
publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no one should be
allowed to object. Those who came in at the beginning consented,
and those who came later bought stock the price of which reflected
233
the corporation's tempered commitment to a profit objective.
If corporations are enterprises defined by the emergent pattern of
individual agreements rather than some master norm of economic efficiency, it does not mean that entrepreneurs and others should not be free
230.

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991).
231.
See JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 5 (1992) ("Markets are most attractive where
individuals have broadly divergent conceptions of the good ... ").According to Coleman, "The
market is a particularly appropriate form of rational organization under certain sets of empirical
circumstances, including heterogeneity of values, cultural diversity, geographic dispersion and the
like. In such communities markets contribute to social stability. That is their attraction to liberal
political theory." Id.
232. But cf EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 230, at 14 ("Just as there is no right amount
of paint in a car, there is no right relation among managers, investors, and other corporate participants. The relation must be worked out one firm at a time.").
233.
Id. at 35-36.
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to opt into the regime of hyper-formalism advocated by Schwartz and
Scott. Nothing in the arguments offered above suggest that their basic
insight that hyperformalism increases the value of contracts taken together is incorrect. No doubt, the sole goal of some parties (perhaps
most parties) is to maximize the value of their contracts as a portfolio.
Autonomy theories have no objection to parties choosing such a hyperformalist regime either through integration clauses or-more effectively-through arbitration agreements that move litigation over contracts into private, hyperformalist forums. Indeed, there is empirical
evidence suggesting that parties who have a bundle of largely fungible
commodity contracts prefer precisely the kind of hyper-formalism advocated by Schwartz and Scott and have created private forums accordingly.234
All of this is unobjectionable to autonomy theories so long as it
represents the actual intent of the parties, rather than a one-size fits all
norm imposed by law. This stance necessarily commits autonomy theories to an inescapable first question when interpreting contracts: What is
the intent of the parties? Even when the intent is that other intentions be
ignored and that a written agreement be woodenly interpreted, autonomy
theories require that we first identify this intention. Such an inquiry will
inevitably impose costs that could be avoided by adopting the regime
envisioned by Schwartz and Scott. Although I have argued elsewhere for
the priority of liberty to welfare in contract law,235 I freely admit that
such increased costs may be a valid objection to autonomy theories. It
must be noted, however, that such objections have nothing whatsoever to
do with the nature of corporations. The argument applies equally well to
contracts between individuals, and as we have seen incorporation works
no legal or metaphysical transformation on the contracts negotiated between firms. Ultimately, the question must be fought out on the merits
of the respective theories themselves.
VI. A LESSON FOR CONTRACT THEORY

The demise of the Artificial Personality Argument illustrates one of
the key problems facing the "horizontal independence" strategy. Recall
that the horizontal independence strategy seeks to resolve the conflict
between autonomy theories and efficiency theories by demonstrating that
they are actually theories of different things. The Artificial Personality
Argument ultimately flounders on the fact that both the economics relied
on by the welfare theorists and the liberal political philosophy relied on
by the autonomy theorists are essentially individualistic. This commit234.
See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Searchfor Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) (discussing contract interpretation in merchant courts set up by commodity traders).
235. See Oman, supra note 12, at 1499-1503 (arguing for the priority, but not the exclusivity,
of autonomy theories on the basis of the philosophy of John Rawls).
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ment to individualism means that neither approach can consistently invoke some non-individualistic concept such as the corporation to sidestep any conflicts. To be sure, they use individualism in different ways,
but in the end, they are talking about the same things: actual human beings. This convergence is precisely what the horizontal independence
strategy seeks to deny.
The ultimate convergence of both welfare and autonomy theories on
the individual comes from two forms of reductionism that are key to contemporary economics. First, economics in its positive form is reductionist, focusing on the individual rational actor as the primary unit of social
explanation. Second, economics is normatively reductionist in that it
once again uses individuals as the primary unit of measurement. When
economists speak of efficiency or wealth maximization they are talking
in terms of social aggregates. What economists are aggregating, however, are the satisfactions of individuals. Hence, there is no sense in
which society is deemed to have or experience satisfaction independent
of the individuals who make it up. These two forms of reductionism are
what make economics such an attractive tool for policy analysis. The
rational actor model allows a policy analyst to predict the effects of particular policies by deducing how agents bent on satisfaction of their preferences would behave in response. The same deductive model allows us
to make comparative judgments about the extent to which differing policies satisfy preferences. Both the positive and the normative judgments
focus our attention relentlessly on the individual, and it is at this point
that the conflict with autonomy theories becomes inevitable.
The vast majority of law and economics literature on contracts is
implicitly or explicitly normative.236 Economic theorists of contract law
do not regard efficiency as simply one potentially interesting equilibrium
point predicted by their positive model of contracting behavior. 7
Rather, they use it as criteria for judging the desirability of differing rules
of law.238 When coupled with the methodological individualism of eco236.
See Kraus, supra note 23, at 694 ("Legal theory is both a normative and explanatory
enterprise. Most contemporary contract theories at least implicitly pursue both enterprises simultaneously.").
237.
A. Mitchell Polinsky provides a representative example of the ease with which economic
theorists use the concept of efficiency as a normative criteria, invoking it as both a welfare maximizing principle and as an indicator of hypothetical consent:
Contract law can be viewed as filling in [the] "gaps" in the contract - attempting to reproduce what the parties would have agreed to if they could have costlessly planned for
the event initially. Since the parties would have included contract terms that maximize
their joint benefits net their joint costs - both parties can thereby be made better off- this
approach is equivalent to designing contract law according to the efficiency criterion.
A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICs 29 (3d ed. 2003).

238.
See, e.g., Janet Kiholm Smith & Richard L. Smith, ContractLaw, Mutual Mistake, and
Incentives to Produce and Disclose Information, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 467 (1990); Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87 (1989); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984);
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract,26 J. L. & ECON. 691 (1983);
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nomics, efficiency theories of contract will necessarily discuss the same
things as autonomy theories because while each theory conceptualizes
human individuality differently, both approaches are ultimately directed
at actual people. The conflict can only be resolved using the horizontal
independence strategy if one of the theories abandons its claim to being
normative.239 This happy solution is unlikely to work. Although autonomy theories might be conceptualized purely as interpretations of existing legal doctrines, the fact of the matter is that those who adopt autonomy theories almost universally tend to do so because they find the theories normatively attractive on the merits.240 Likewise, the convergence of
positive and normative individualism in economics means that few law
and economics scholars are going to give up their role as prescriptive
policy analysts. So long as efficiency theorists and autonomy theorists
both offer arguments for how contract law should be, a conflict remains
to be solved. The idea of a new lex mercatoriamay play a role in such a
resolution, but if it does it will likely employ a vertical integration strategy such as that put forth by Farber,24 1 rather than the horizontal independence approach of the Artificial Personality Argument.
CONCLUSION
Despite the criticisms that I have made of attempts to establish efficiency as a master norm for contract law, this article is not an exercise in
econophobia. I believe that economics offers important insights into the
law 242 and that ultimately no theory of contract can afford not to incorporate the insights of law and economics. 2 43 Nor, despite the fact that I
have spent much of this article defending them, am I ultimately persuaded by autonomy theories of contract. Rather, I believe that contract
theory must find some principled integration of the two approaches.
Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationalefor an Inflexible
Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 515 (1981); Steven Shavell, Damage Measuresfor Breach of Contract, 11
BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980); Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, LiquidatedDamages, Penaltiesand the
Just CompensationPrinciple:Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and Theory ofEfficient Breach,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); John H. Barton, The Economic Basis for Breach of Contract, I J.
LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972).

239. This, of course, is exactly the position that Jody Kraus tries to defend, arguing that law
and economic theory is a kind of behavioralist explanation of contract case outcomes. See Kraus,
supra note 23, at 689.
240. Stephen Smith has pointed out that:
Although the best known answers to the analytic question are prima facie open to both
utilitarian and rights-based justifications, in practice scholars who defend particular answers to the analytic question also hold that, in the end, there is only one good justification (the justification they defend) for the obligation they have identified.
SMITH, supra note 2, at 49.

241.
See generally Farber, supra note 10 (arguing that in the context of commercial law an
efficiency standard can be derived from an autonomy norm).
242. Indeed, elsewhere I have offered a traditional law-and-economics analysis in defense of
the use of legislative history to construe statutes. See Nathan Oman, Statutory Interpretation in
Econotopia,25 PACE L. REV. 49, 72-83 (2005).
243.
See Oman, supra note 12, at 1504-06 (arguing that an adequate theory of contract must
incorporate economic arguments).
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Unfortunately, the Artificial Personality Argument cannot harmonize the
discordant voices of autonomy and welfare theories of contract. While it
appears superficially appealing to efficiency theorists, on closer examination the theories of the corporation that it requires in order to be coherent cannot be reconciled with the methodological individualism of economics. Armed with the nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation,
autonomy theorists can deploy arguments developed in other contexts to
account for firm-to-firm contracts. Obviously, the autonomy arguments
that I have discussed are deeply controversial and not without their
weaknesses. However, one need not be a partisan of such approaches to
appreciate the key insight of this paper: While the injection of the corporation into contract theory throws up new examples of old problems, it
does not pose any fundamentally new or unique issues for autonomy
theories. A new lex mercatoriamay indeed hold the promise of reconciling the competing approaches to contract, but the promise does not lie in
the fact that autonomy theories can be summarily banished from its domain. Rather, the meta-theoretical advantage of a new lex mercatoria
must lie in its ability to make the principled integration of autonomy and
welfare theories into a single approach more tractable.

